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PUBLIC CHOICE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND THE
MEANING OF THE MODERN STATE: KEEP
THE BATHWATER, BUT THROW OUT
THAT BABY
Edward L. Rubint
INTRODUCTION
Every political theory is premised on a psychology. The term
"politics" refers to relationships among human beings, and such rela-
tionships cannot be described without a theory about the way that
human beings behave. Some political theorists are explicit about
their psychological presuppositions. Aquinas turned to law and polit-
ics in Summa Theologica only after an extensive explication of the soul,
intellect, and appetites;' Hobbes devoted the first quarter of his Levia-
than to a discussion "Of Man" before proceeding to "The Common-
wealth";2 Kant prefaced his Metaphysics of Morals with the more
influential Groundwork3 Other theorists provide no such analysis-
Montesquieu plunged into his discussion of laws4 and Robert Dahl
into his discussion of democracy5 without psychological prelimina-
ries-but these discussions are no less dependent on a theory of
human behavior. Montesquieu premised his discussion on the idea
that climate and culture shape people's preferences while Dahl
treated people as being governed by fixed and largely self-centered
interests.
A psychology is not enough, however. While political science in-
volves human beings, it is not a study of human beings in their individ-
ual capacity. Rather, it is the study of group behavior-of the
governance institutions, ephemeral or permanent, static or dynamic,
that human beings create, and of the collective actions in which they
engage. Individuals can influence the politics of a nation, but only if
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I ST. THOMtAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Prov-
ince trans., R&T Washboume, Ltd. 1911).
2 THOMtAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt I, chs. 1-16 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651).
3 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor
trans., 1998) (1785); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans.,
1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, MErAPHYSICS].
4 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAivs (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. and eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
5 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
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they lead an institution or a social movement.6 Thus, a political the-
ory must explain how individuals join together to form these institu-
tions or movements, as well as the way in which individual psychology
expresses itself in group behavior. This is the notorious macro-micro
problem of social science. 7
Legal scholars who identify themselves with public choice theory
have been quite explicit about the microeconomic, or "Chicago
School" psychological model that underlies their work.8 The essential
and familiar components of this model are that human beings are
instrumentally rational and motivated by self-interest.9 Consequently,
they will try to maximize their self-interest in any situation, 10 and will
do so in a manner dictated by general principles of rationality."
These two premises are linked to group behavior through the princi-
ple of methodological individualism, the claim that all such behavior
is the result of identifiably individual action. 12
6 For discussions of social movements in American sociology, see, for example, JoHN
D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA (1973);
ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT (John Keane & Paul Mier eds., 1989);
ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973); ALAIN TOURAINE,
THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Alan Duff trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1981).
7 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1963);
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 6 (1990); THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978); Randall Collins, On the Microfoundations of
Macrosociology, 86 AM. J. Soc. 984, 985-86 (1981).
In some cases, public institutions themselves are designed to resolve the macro-micro
problem. The most obvious example is an election, where government agencies create a
procedure in which unorganized individuals can vote, and then use the results of the vote
as the basis for action. While this is obviously a central aspect of our political system, it
does not obviate the need to explain the existence and operation of institutions and social
movements.
8 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1988) (stating that "[p]ubic choice... applies
game theory and microeconomic analysis to the production of law by legislatures, regula-
tory agencies and courts"); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101-02 (1987); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public
Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine 77 CAL. L. REV.
83, 85 (1989).
9 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1-2 (1989) ("The basic behavioral postu-
late of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility
maximizer.").
10 Maximization is not a separate premise, but a consequence or implication of the
premise that human beings are instrumentally rational. As David Gauthier stated: "Practi-
cal rationality in the most general sense is identified with maximization. Problems of ra-
tional choice are thus of a well-known mathematical type; one seeks to maximize some
quantity subject to some constraint." DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 22 (1986).
11 For general statements of this view, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice in PER-
SPECTIVES ON PoSrrIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172-77 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A- Shepsle
eds., 1990).
12 SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 13-14
(1962); Jon Elster, Introduction to RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 3 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Dennis C.
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On the basis of these premises, legal scholars assert that public
choice can predict political action. Because people are self-interest
maximizers, they will always move in a direction that can be deter-
mined by external observation; because they are instrumentally ra-
tional, the means they select to move in this direction can be
determined by any rational observer familiar with their situation.
Consequently, public choice advocates claim that this theory promises
to make political science a true science for the first time in its
history.' 3
The microeconomic model has never been uncontroversial, but
the controversy has intensified as the proponents of that model have
sallied forth from their home territory of economic action and at-
tempted to conquer new fields such as sociology, political science, and
law. The counterattack to this movement has been so intense that
both essential premises of microeconomics are now regarded as inva-
lid by a large part of the social science, psychology, and philosophical
communities.' 4 As a result, some legal scholars reject public choice in
its entirety, arguing that it is based on an unrealistic and perverse con-
ception of human behavior.15 The majority of legal scholars, however,
reject the microeconomic model but acknowledge that rationality and
material self-interest explain some human actions in both the eco-
nomic and political realms.' 6 In their view, one should not throw the
public choice baby out with the bathwater. Rather, one should make
use of public choice to the extent that its insights are persuasive, and
look elsewhere when its conclusions cease to be convincing.
In this Article, I argue that rejecting the microeconomic model of
human behavior has more severe consequences for public choice the-
ory. The problem is that the microeconomic model implies a particu-
lar and contestable image of society. Once theorists acknowledge the
Mueller, Public Chwice in Perspective, in PERSPECrIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 3-4 (Dennis C.
Mueller ed., 1997).
13 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public
Choice; 12 Irr'L REv. L. & ECON. 284, 286 (1992) ("One cannot put any model to the
ultimate test (indeed, definition) of science-falsifiability-unless it is comprehensive
enough to make predictions and comparable enough to other models to allow different
persons working in the same field to converse.").
14 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RA-
TIONAL=tY (1989); AMrrA ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS
(1988); ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
(1988); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
(1994); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWs OF MARKET SOCIETv AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS
(1986); Margaret Levi et al., Introduction to THE LIMITS OF RATIONAIaT 1 (Karen Schweers
Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990); Amartya Sen, Rational Fools, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 317
(1977).
15 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement; 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 202-03 (1988).
16 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 117-18
(1991) (listing positive contributions of public choice theory to public law analysis).
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empirical weaknesses of the microeconomic model and reject its
premises as a convincing account of human behavior, the image of
society that forms the foundation of public choice analysis is open to
attack. As a result, public choice theory cannot simply be modified by
using a more complex and empirically accurate model of human be-
havior. Rather, political scientists and economists must reassess the
theory in its entirety. They must begin with an alternative model of
society, a different starting point for political analysis. The alternative
will depend, as always, on the psychology that underlies it, and on the
way that psychology is linked to group behavior.
The psychology that I propose as an alternative to the
microeconomic model is based upon phenomenology. This model
preserves the principle of instrumental rationality as a component of
behavior, and also preserves the principle of methodological individ-
ualism as a solution to the macro-micro problem. Because both of
these premises are highly attractive, their retention represents a signif-
icant epistemological advantage. Phenomenology diverges from pub-
lic choice theory by challenging the second microeconomic principle
of behavior, the idea that people are motivated entirely by self-inter-
est. The alternative it proposes resolves most of the empirical difficul-
ties that have bedeviled public choice, but also generates a different
model of society in general.
This alternative model of society serves as the basis of this Article.
The critique of public choice on the ground that its behavioral prem-
ises are unconvincing is already familiar, and widely accepted. What I
want to argue is that the image of society that these premises imply is
equally unconvincing, specifically because it misinterprets the basic
nature of the modern administrative state. Replacing the
microeconomic model with a phenomenological one thus provides a
different and more convincing account of contemporary government.
Focusing on public choice's image of society provides a means of
refuting the most sophisticated effort to rescue public choice from the
implausibility of its behavioral premises. Proponents of public choice
sometimes argue that only the microeconomic model of human be-
havior provides predictability in political theory, and is worth retain-
ing on that ground alone. 17 It is advantageous, they maintain, to
accept the microeconomic model of behavior to see how far it will
lead and how much it can explain. The explanations obtained from
this inquiry will reflect our most reliable form of knowledge, that is,
knowledge that leads to confirmed predictions. Whatever remains,
whatever cannot be explained by the microeconomic model, can be
consigned to less satisfactory, less scientific explanations, and to the
17 See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 31.
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unfortunate complexity of human behavior. This approach may be
called presumptive public choice.18
If the criticism of public choice's behavioral premises translates
into a criticism of the image of society which sets the framework for
public choice analysis, however, then the theory cannot be used in this
presumptive manner. It is defective from the outset, and all its con-
clusions, no matter how fully they seem to be confirmed, will suffer
from this same defect. Even if public choice theory advances predic-
tions that are subsequently confirmed, those predictions may be noth-
ing more than tautologies that confirm themselves, or observations
that are better explained by an alternative approach. Even more basi-
cally, the underlying premise that accurate prediction is the test of a
theory's validity is itself open to question. It is a pre-analytic assump-
tion of public choice scholarship that depends on the same positivist
behavioral premises as public choice itself, and it is subject to the
same objections.
This does not mean that all of the conclusions reached by public
choice scholars are wrong, or that the motivations that public choice
ascribes to human beings never occur. Rather, the point is that its
premises and conclusions should be set within a different analytic
framework as special cases of a more general situation that must be
described in other terms. This approach preserves some of public
choice's insights, but in a diluted form; it keeps the bathwater but
discards the baby.
Part I of this Article describes the public choice theory of human
behavior. Part II offers an alternative theory of behavior, grounded in
Husserl's phenomenology. Part III describes and compares the rival
images of the state produced by these two behavioral theories. Part IV
considers the implications of the two images for the agenda of legal
scholarship.
I
THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF HuMAN BEHAVIOR
The behavioral premises of the microeconomic model on which
public choice relies are familiar, and are the subject of an enormous
scholarly literature. Nonetheless, it is useful to describe them briefly.
The first premise, which the microeconomic model shares with all
other rational choice theories, is the concept of instrumental rational-
ity-namely that people try to achieve their goals in an optimal fash-
ion. This is Weber's concept of instrumental rationality. In place of
the unitary concept of reason that is so prominent in the Western
18 See Terry M. Moe, Cynicism and Political Theoy, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 362, 369-70
(2002).
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philosophical tradition, Weber treated rationality as a mode of social
action and identified two different types. The first, instrumental ra-
tionality, is "determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects
in the environment and of other human beings." 19 The second type,
values rationality, is "determined by a conscious belief in the value for
its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of be-
havior, independently of its prospects for success." 20 In other words,
instrumental rationality is a mode of social action that determines the
optimal means to achieve a particular end, whereas values rationality
is a mode of social action that determines the end itself.21
The microeconomic model adopts this premise that people pur-
sue their goals by acting in an instrumentally rational manner. In the
absence of further assertions about human behavior, it is what John
Ferejohn has referred to as a "thin" theory of rationality. 22 All it ar-
gues is that people adopt the optimal strategy to achieve their goals,23
and that their goals are transitive and stable. 24 Of course, it does not
propose that people never make mistakes; the strategies that they
19 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1954).
20 Id. at 24-25.
21 While Weber identified this mode of rationality and recognized its power, he cer-
tainly did not approve of it. For Weber, instrumental rationality without value rationality
was an iron cage, an unconsidered and unsatisfying way to live one's life. MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181-83 (Talcott Parsons trans., Scribner
1958). According to Weber:
[T] he idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost
of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot di-
rectly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the
other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individ-
ual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its
highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped
of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely
mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport.
Id. at 182. For a partial response, see ROBERT NoZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 133-39
(1993).
22 John Ferejohn, Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart
England, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS 279, 282 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed.,
1991). Ferejohn's terminology is adopted in GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 17-19.
Korobkin and Ulen offer a further distinction between the "definitional" version of ra-
tional actor theory and expected utility theory. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1060-64 (2000). For present purposes, the two may be treated as a
single approach.
23 See GAUTHIER, supra note 10, at 26-28; MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION 65 (1965); John C. Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in
RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 12, at 81, 83-87.
24 See ARRow, supra note 7, at 11-17; FARBER & FvICKEY, supra note 16, at 43-47. Tran-
sitivity means that if the actor prefers A to B and B to C, she will prefer A to C. Stability, or
invariance, means that the actor's choices do not change on the basis of the way the choice
is presented, or the actor's choice of strategy for achieving it.
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adopt are optimal only within the constraints that act upon them.25
People must function with limited knowledge, within limited time,
and with limited cognitive abilities, but the suboptimal choices that
result from these limitations do not violate the premise of human ra-
tionality. We would describe a chess player as adopting an instrumen-
tally rational strategy to achieve the goal of winning his game even if
he did not know all the standard openings and lacked both the time
and the intelligence to devise effective moves. He would be acting
irrationally only if he did not make his own best move, defined as the
move he was capable of making that was most likely to achieve his goal
of winning. Similarly, the requirement of stable preferences does not
mean that people cannot change their preferences over time to re-
flect altered circumstances or personal development. What would vio-
late the principle of instrumental rationality would be to change one's
goal as a result of the way the choice is presented, or as a result of
one's own choice of strategy. Our chess player, for example, would be
acting irrationally if he decided he no longer wanted to win once his
unskillful quality of play cost him his bishop. The old joke about the
man looking under a street light for a key he had dropped somewhere
else because he could see better under the light is another example of
this irrationality. Although this sort of behavior relates to goals, it can
be treated as a failure of instrumental rationality, because changing
one's goal for irrational reasons destroys the instrumental nature of
the strategy.2 6
Herbert Simon, and subsequently Oliver Williamson, have at-
tacked the instrumental rationality component of the microeconomic
model. They have argued that people's cognitive capacities are gener-
ally too limited for them to make optimal choices, even allowing for
the constraints of time and information.2 7 According to Simon, indi-
viduals confronted with a complex array of options do not attempt to
optimize; instead they satisfice, using heuristics to reach an acceptable
solution.28 Mark Seidenfeld describes this as cognitive loafing,29 while
25 SeeJon Elster, When Rationality Fails, in THE LIMrrs OF RATIONALTy, supra note 14, at
1, 21-24.
26 This is similar to the issue of a divergence between revealed and expressed prefer-
ences, because the chess player's expressed preference, as stated at the outset, is to win,
and he has no rational basis for changing it. See GAuTHIER, supra note 10, at 28 ("If a
person's revealed and expressed preferences diverge, then her values are confused and she
lacks an adequate basis for rational choice.").
27 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 3-8 (2d ed. 1957); Oliver E. William-
son, Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITTmONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 99, 101-05 (1993). Simon emphasizes the individual's cognitive limits
and the cost of acquiring information. Williamson amplifies Simon's argument by discuss-
ing the limits of language and other modes of communication.
28 SIMON, supra note 27, at 3-8.
29 Mark D. Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 492 (2002).
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Jeffrey Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina attribute it to cognitive illu-
sions.30 It means that our chess player would not even think through
all the plausible moves to the best of his limited knowledge, intelli-
gence, and time; instead, weary or impatient with the effort, he would
make the first non-disastrous move that occurred to him, or adopt
some unproven heuristic (i.e., never move the same piece twice in a
row).31 Impaired decisionmaking of this sort is sometimes described
as bounded rationality, a term also used to describe the constraints on
optimal decisionmaking (such as limited information) that a fully ra-
tional person experiences, and that comport with strictly neoclassic
microeconomics. 32 For clarity, scholars who use this term should
specify whether they are referring to constrained decisionmaking or
impaired decisionmaking, that is, to decisionmaking that is subject to
informational and processing constraints, or to decisionmaking that is
less than optimal even when such constraints are taken into
consideration.
A second line of attack on the behavioral premise of instrumental
rationality has come from cognitive psychologists, most notably
Kahneman and Tversky. In a series of laboratory experiments, they
discovered that people tend to rely heavily on heuristics, that their
decisions are strongly influenced by extraneous factors, and that they
do not even exhibit stable preferences.33 Instead, they suffer from a
variety of cognitive illusions, such as the endowment bias, the hind-
sight bias, and the optimism bias. Thus, our chess player, in addition
to following rules of thumb, will make a different move if his oppo-
nent moves her piece slowly rather than quickly, or will decide, after
the opponent makes a particularly effective move, that he did not
want to win the game at all, but only make it interesting.
These critiques of instrumental rationality seem convincing, but
it is somewhat difficult to know what one should do with them. Cer-
tainly, they serve as a useful caution against naive assumptions of in-
strumental rationality. Additionally, these criticisms cannot be readily
dismissed with the microeconomic argument that a functioning mar-
ket will eliminate actors who consistently make suboptimal choices
through the Darwinian process of competition. As rational choice
30 JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 555 (2002).
31 See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION
161, 165-71 (C.B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972).
32 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 434-35 (1995).
33 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VAL-
UES, AND FRAMES 1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRicA 263
(1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction toJUDGMENr UNDER UNCERTAINTY
1, 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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theorists readily, and even enthusiastically acknowledge, this process
will not operate fully if the market is inefficiently regulated or other-
wise impaired, and may not operate at all in non-market situations
such as governmental action.34 Moreover, transaction costs, agency
problems, path dependence, and network externalities make markets
much less responsive than neoclassical economics claims. 35
The problem with this critique of instrumental rationality is that
its scope and boundaries are indeterminate. As William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn observe in this Symposium, it is difficult to know which
bias will operate in a given situation.36 Moreover, few critics would be
willing to abandon the idea that people are instrumentally rational on
some occasions. 37 If there are numerous examples of irrational be-
havior, there are certainly numerous others, perhaps a majority,
where people's behavior perfectly comports with the model of instru-
mental rationality. When playing chess, most people play as hard as
they can, and play to win. On reflection, as Lisa Heinzerling and
Frank Ackerman note, the irrational behavior that cognitive psycholo-
gists observe occurs in a laboratory setting, where people lack the con-
textual clues that guide them in ordinary life. 38 Finally, quite apart
from the empirical problems with abandoning instrumental rational-
ity, the epistemological problems are quite formidable. After all, how
do we, as observers, know that someone is behaving irrationally unless
we ourselves are capable of rational thought and can compare their
behavior to the instrumentally rational solution?
The second behavioral premise of public choice theory is that
individuals, in addition to being instrumentally rational, are utility
maximizers. This premise incorporates the thin theory of rationality
that represents public choice's first behavioral premise, but thickens
this theory by asserting that rational actors are interested in maximiz-
34 See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity, 5J.L. & ECON. 1, 11-12 (1962).
35 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 8-40, 132-54 (1975) (agency
problems and transactions costs); Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns,
and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON.J. 116, 123-26 (1989) (path dependence); Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 725-30, 733-36 (1997) (network externalities).
36 William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616, 633 (2002).
37 See Dennis Chong, Rational Choice Theory's Mysterious Rivals, in THE RATIONAL
CHOICE CoNTRovERsY 37 (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996).
38 Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 648 (2002).
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ing a particular type of goal.3 9 In philosophic terms, it is related to
the principle of egoism. 40
Several bodies of scholarship that are sometimes associated with
public choice do not assert this additional behavioral premise. Social
choice theory, which focuses on the aggregation of individual prefer-
ences, generally proceeds by recognizing that people have different
preferences that they attempt to realize, without making any asser-
tions about the nature of those preferences. This approach has pro-
duced a number of notable findings, some of which are directly
relevant to law. For example, social choice theory is used to explain
how different voting schemes reflect or fail to reflect the preferences
of the voters. 4 1 Another methodology based on rational choice is pos-
itive political theory.42 It assumes that political actors like Congress or
the President are motivated by the desire to maximize the implemen-
tation of their positions, but it does not depend on any particular as-
sertion about the nature or origin of those positions. 43 This
behavioral assumption is not fully realistic, and furthermore abandons
the principle of methodological individualism. Nonetheless, it per-
mits the direct application of game theory, a powerful mode of mathe-
matical analysis, to political issues. Once again, many of its findings
are directly relevant to law.
Precisely which of these rational action theories constitute "pub-
lic choice" when applied to political issues is an open question,44 al-
though it is probably an uninteresting debate that can quickly be
resolved by terminological clarity. But the term "public choice," as it
appears in legal scholarship, refers to a thick rational action theory
39 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The incorporation is a matter of prac-
tice, not logic. In theory, one could maintain that individuals are entirely self-interested,
but are not rational about those self-interests. While there are a number of empirical stud-
ies that perceive such behavior, see, e.g., COLIN M. TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
(1972), it has not become the basis of a scholarly methodology.
40 See GAUTHIER, supra note 10, at 86-87; W.D. Falk, Morality, Self, and Others, in ETHICS
349, 371-75 (Judithj. Thomson & Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, Egoism
and Altruism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 462, 462-66 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
41 See ARRow, supra note 7, at 6; Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11
PUB. CHOICE 17, 17-18 (1971).
42 See HERVIt MOULIN, GAME THEORY FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d & rev. ed., 1986);
PETER C. ORDEsHooK, A POLTICAL THEORY PRIMER (1992).
43 For example, the Prisoner's Dilemma, one of the standard tools of positive political
theory, works just as well with altruists as it does with egoists. Assume that St. Peter and St.
Andrew are both arrested by the Romans. Each is perfectly content to be martyred, but
intent on saving the other. Denied the ability to communicate and given only one chance
to play, they will end up with the same suboptimal result as rational egoists; each will con-
fess to Christianity to save the other, with the result that both will suffer a greater penalty
than they would have had they remained silent.
44 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. R v. 647, 663 (1997) (reviewing MAxwELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw (1997)).
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that incorporates the additional premise of the microeconomic
model, namely that people are motivated by the desire to maximize
their self-interest.45 Perhaps this results from the influence of Richard
Posner,46 or perhaps it reflects a deeper set of ideological commit-
ments on the part of the scholars who adopted the microeconomic
model. Certainly other rational action theories have appeared in legal
scholarship. Claire Finkelstein, 47 Heidi Hurd,48 Leo Katz,49 and
Michael Moore5 ° have used the thin theory of rationality to analyze
certain jurisprudential issues; social choice theory has been used by
Saul Levmore,51 Frank Easterbrook,52 and William Mayton; 53 and pos-
itive political theory has been used by Daniel Rodriguez 54 and William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey. 55 None of these works, however, are typi-
cally regarded by legal academics as public choice scholarship. Within
legal scholarship, public choice is used, with reasonable consistency,
as a reference to the Chicago School model. 56
45 See supra note 8.
46 See POSNER, supra note 32. Posner, like Gary Becker, belongs to the "hard core"
group of interdisciplinary economists who believe that virtually any area of human en-
deavor can be analyzed through the use of a strict microeconomic, or Chicago School,
model of behavior. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 2-3 (1992) (theorizing
that rational choice is a "paramount" dimension of sexual behavior); Elisabeth M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
47 Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARiz. L.
Rxv. 251 (1995); Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of
SelfDefense to its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1361 (1999).
48 HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999); Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100
YALE L.J. 1611 (1991).
49 Leo Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1465 (1998); Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful
One, 88 CAL. L. Ray. 791 (2000).
50 MICHEL S. MOORE, Acr AND CaIME (1993).
51 Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making and the Voting Paradox, 75
VA. L. Ray. 971 (1989).
52 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
53 William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and
the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948.
54 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1 (1994); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 217 (1992).
55 William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 H-ARv. L. REv. 27 (1994); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991).
56 For some recent examples from my own field of administrative law and legislative
policy, see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 11 (1997) (explaining that public choice insists we "must always seek
to understand political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behaviors");
Jonathan R. Macey, Minstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, 6 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 173, 176
(1998) ("According to the public choice theory of legislation, market forces provide strong
incentives for self-interested politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public
interests .... ."); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEo. L.J. 97, 102 (2000) ("The starting point for any public choice analysis is the
Madisonian assumption that individuals are rational and self-interested; an individual,
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There is a deep ambivalence within public choice scholarship
about whether the interests that constitute self-interest for the pur-
pose of its behavioral model are limited to material matters, or
whether they extend to such discarnate concerns as power, prestige,
and leisure. 57 Each position has its virtues, but each suffers from such
serious defects that public choice scholars are continually motivated
to oscillate between the two, thereby avoiding the crushing blow that
they would suffer if they remained in one position by slipping away to
the refuge of the other, or using the oscillation to create the illusion
that both positions can be simultaneously maintained, as a sort of con-
ceptual thaumatrope.
The advantage of asserting that all human behavior results from
the desire to maximize material self-interest is that such behavior is
easy to understand, subject to fairly unambiguous observation, and
easily modeled in terms of maximization. 58 The disadvantage is that
this model of human behavior is entirely implausible and readily dis-
confirmed in almost every effort to extend it beyond the economic
realm. Within the political sphere that constitutes the subject matter
of this Symposium, material self-interest models have been energeti-
cally proposed and convincingly refuted in such disparate areas as vot-
ing behavior, social movement participation, legislative action, and
judicial decisionmaking.
For instance, public choice scholars have hypothesized that citi-
zens vote on the basis of their material interests.59 Yet for the past
2400 years, political theorists have wondered about the question
raised in Aristotle's Politics:60 why the majority of voters in a demo-
cratic polity do not vote for the radical redistribution of wealth from
when presented with a choice, will choose the alternative that is utility maximizing.");
Daniel S. Herzfeld, Comment, Accountability and the Nondelegation of Unfunded Mandates: A
Public Choice Analysis of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment Federalism Jurisprudence, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 419, 420 (1999) (acknowledging social choice theory, but applying interest
group theory, which holds that "legislators are rational vote-seeking individuals motivated
in large part by the overriding goal of reelection"). Maxwell L. Stearns, in his reader,
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997), does include a chapter on social choice, id. at
255-472, but he separates it from his introductory chapter on public choice, and he titles
that introductory chapter "The Public Choice Assumptions: Rationality and Self Interest,"
id. at 3.
57 See infra notes 58-87 and accompanying analysis.
58 Regarding the maximization issue, the beauty of material benefits is that they can
be converted to money and that, various musical comedy songs notwithstanding, it is always
better to have more money than less.
59 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 110-14 (1967)
(illustrating how people are more likely to vote when there is potentially a high personal
payoff); William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 ANI.
POL. ScL Rxv. 25, 25 (1968) (arguing that voting patterns are consistent with rationalist
theories).
60 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bks. IV, xii & V, v, at 270-72, 310-13 (T.A. Sinclair trans.,
rev. ed. 1981). Aristotle advised that:
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the wealthy to the general population. Studies of voting behavior re-
peatedly demonstrate that people do not vote in accordance with
their economic self-interest. 61 A more recent conundrum, at least for
thoroughgoing rational choice theorists, is why individuals take the
trouble to vote at all, given the unlikelihood, even (or perhaps espe-
cially) after the recent presidential election, that their votes will affect
the outcome.62 With respect to social movements, Mancur Olson em-
ployed a material self-interest model in a 1965 book to explain why
certain groups could coalesce to produce politically effective organiza-
tions, while other groups could not. Olson concluded that such orga-
nizations can be created and maintained if the group's members have
an economic stake in the organization's goals, and the political entre-
preneurs in charge can police the movement to avoid free-riding, that
is, gaining the benefits of group activity without incurring the cost of
participation. 63 By 1968, however, this creative explanation was dis-
confirmed by the rise of the environmental, peace, and anti-nuclear
movements, whose members generally had no direct economic stake
in the movements' goals and participated enthusiastically without any
policing mechanism. 64 The subsequent development of the animal
rights movement, the anti-abortion movement, the prisoners' rights
movement, and the expansion of older efforts such as the interna-
tional human rights movement emphasizes the point.65 Theorists of
[I]n order to win the favor of the multitude [democratic leaders] treat the
notables unjustly and cause them to unite. Sometimes they make them split
up their possessions or income in order to finance public duties; sometimes
they bring slanderous accusations against the rich with a view to confiscat-
ing their money.
Id. bk. V, v, at 311. Significantly, Aristotle defines democracy as the rule of the poor over
the rich, not the rule of the many over the few, although he observes that the first will
typically imply the second. Id. bks. III, viii & IV, iv, at 190-92, 244-51.
61 See BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 152-64 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1978) (1970); Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky, The Impartial Spectator Goes to
Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Behavior, I ECON. & PHIL. 189, 190-91
(1985); Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND
DISCONT'NT 206, 219-27 (David E. Apter ed., 1964).
62 FARBER & FIucKE, supra note 16, at 24-27; R.E. Goodin & KW.S. Roberts, The Ethi-
cal Voter, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 926, 926-27 (1975); Howard Margolis, Probability of a Tie
Election, 31 PUB. CHOICE 135 (1977).
63 See OLSON, supra note 23.
64 For discussions of these movements, see DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE WORKS: THE CIT-
ZEN'S ROLE IN ENDING THE COLD WAR (1993); BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST AND
CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1991); ANDREWJAMISON ET AL., THE MAKING OF THE NEW ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1990); THOMAS R. ROCHON, MOBILIZING FOR PEACE: THE AN-
TINUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1988); STATES AND ANrI-NucLEAR MOVEMENTS
(Helena Flam ed., 1994); Stephen Cotgrove & Andrew Duff, Environmentalism, Middle-Class
Radicalism and Politics, 28 Soc. REv. 333 (1980).
65 For accounts of these movements, see HAROLD D. GUITHER, ANIMAL RIGHTS (1998);
JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE (1992); KRISTIN LUKER,
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-
CHOICE MOVEMENT (1991). This observation can probably be generalized to the great ma-
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social movements, particularly the resource mobilization school, have
benefitted greatly from Olson's insights, but few accept his univalent
explanation of human motivation. Instead, they recognize that moti-
vations such as social solidarity, identity formation, and ideological
commitment can take the place of material self-interest.66
Public choice scholars sometimes assert that legislators are moti-
vated solely by their desire to get reelected, 67 that is, their desire to
obtain the material benefit of retaining their jobs. Yet almost every
political scientist who has interviewed actual legislators has concluded
that they display a variety of motivations, of which reelection maximiz-
ing is only one.68 Most elected officials are quite concerned about
reelection. Some-the "hacks" in William Muir's study69-are
predominantly motivated by a desire to be reelected. Yet ideology,
respect from colleagues, and the desire to act conscientiously have all
been empirically confirmed as determinants of political behavior.70
Federal judges present an even more serious problem for the material
self-interest model because their entire mode of compensation and
tenure is designed to insulate them from material incentives. Landes
and Posner initially postulated that judges act independently because
jority of social movements. For example, while the civil rights, consumer, and welfare
rights movements seemed oriented around material self-interest, the leading participants
in these movements were often middle-class people who would not benefit from welfare,
and who had the resources or commercial skills to avoid most standard consumer abuses.
The civil rights and welfare rights movements included many Caucasians who would derive
no material benefit from their successes. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 232-33 (1991); SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF
WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 24--26 (1979);
ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 38-40 (1989).
66 While issues of identity are more prominent in the Continental School of social
movement studies, the importance of ideology is well recognized within the American, or
resource mobilization school. See, e.g., GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL
MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION (1993); DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER (1988); ANDREW S.
McFARLAND, COMMON CAUSE (1984);JOHN WILSON, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(1973). Two of the leading scholars in the American school define a social movement as "a
set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some
elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society." John D.
McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and
Social Movements: A Partial Theory, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 15,
20 (Mayer N. Zald &John D. McCarthy eds., 1973).
67 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 31
(1974) (arguing that "reelection is the primary goal [of the representative] that the constit-
uency controls").
68 See, e.g., JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE LAWMAKERS: RECRUITMENT AND ADAPTATION TO
LEGISLATIVE LIFE 8-10, 13-15 (1965); CHRISTOPHERJ. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMIT-
TEES IN CONGRESS 63-86 (3d ed. 1997); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAULJ. QUIRK, THE POLITICS
OF DEREGULATION 134-36 (1985).
69 WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS 159-77
(1982).
70 Id. at 185-86.
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the legislature will reward them with higher salaries, 71 but even Pos-
ner has since retreated from this implausible position.72
The advantage for public choice scholars of allowing a broader
range of interests, such as power, prestige, or leisure, to count as self-
interest is that one avoids many of these empirical implausibilities.
One can then say that people have a taste for voting, that legislators
seek prestige, and that judges like to influence events. The disadvan-
tage of this approach is that one then relinquishes public choice's
claim to predictive ability and even conceptual coherence. 73 Public
choice scholars often assert that their approach is superior to other
social science methodologies because it generates definitive predic-
tions that researchers can confirm or disconfirm. Once one allows for
the inclusion of discarnate interests by substituting a general concept
of utility for material self-interest, the entire theory becomes quasi-
tautological. 74 To say that people maximize their utility says little
more than that they want what they want, an assertion which yields few
of the definitive predictions that constitute the self-declared objective
of rational choice theory.75 One reason why recognizing a broader
71 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 876 (1975)
72 See POSNER, supra note 32, at 111.
73 To take just one example, consider the way Fiorina addresses the awkward fact that
the rational, self-interested model of behavior is disconfirmed in the case of citizen voting.
Morris P. Fiorina, Voting Behavior, in PERSPECrVEs ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 12, at 391.
Because individual votes do not make a difference, he argues that " [v] oting is not an invest-
ment decision but a consumption decision; it is a way for voters to express a preference.
Many citizens take satisfaction in such self-expression, in somewhat the same way that they
enjoy rooting for the home team." Id. at 403. Thus Fiorina concludes that voting behavior
"is predicted by the rational choice perspective that underlies public choice research and is
not a counterexample." Id. at 414. In other words, the votes that people cast violate the
rational actor model. However, because the fact that people vote in the first place also
violates the rational actor model, the votes confirm the rational actor model by reflecting
an individual preference for rooting for one's home team, an action that also violates the
rational actor model.
74 Mueller, in his discussion of the paradox of voting, puts the matter as follows:
Any hypothesis can be reconciled with any conflicting piece of evidence
with the addition of the appropriate auxiliary hypothesis. If I find that the
quantity of Mercedes autos demanded increases following an increase in
their price, I need not reject the law of demand, I need only set it aside, in
this case by assuming a taste for 'snob appeal.' But in so doing I weaken the
law of demand, as a hypothesis let alone as a law, unless I have a tight logi-
cal argument for predicting this taste for snob appeal.
MUELLER, supra note 9, at 351.
75 This criticism does not apply to another response to the empirical difficulties of the
microeconomic model, which is the effort to demonstrate that social norms such as trust
are generated by instrumentally rational, materially self-interested behavior. See ERIC A.
POSNER, LAw AND SocALk Nomss 148-50 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good
Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579-80 (2000).
This effort begins with an acknowledgment that a rational, self-interest-maximizing model
cannot explain observed behavior, and that additional factors, such as social norms, must
be considered. This farther effort to explain the origin of social norms through rational
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range of interests in a rational choice model renders the model quasi-
tautological is that it then becomes impossible to separate revealed
preferences from action. This separation is only possible if a person's
interests are limited to material ones. For example, Max's decision to
buy a certain number of artichokes indicates his preference between
ordering artichokes and the other things that he can obtain with
money. It is easy enough to predict that if the price of artichokes rises
but his income remains the same, he will buy fewer artichokes. It is
also easy enough to conclude that he has suffered a loss of utility as a
result, and moved down to a lower indifference curve. But this ac-
count, which is plausible enough in the commercial realm, does not
work for political decisions, or for any decision that involves more
complex choices.
Suppose Minnie is a legislator who declares her opposition to a
particular development project when only one developer is support-
ing the project, but changes her position when a powerful coalition of
business interests back the proposal.76 Can we predict her change in
position as a response to this lobbying effort? Can we say that she has
suffered a loss of utility because the price of her original preference
has increased to the point where she must move to a lower indiffer-
ence curve? Public choice theorists assert that we can do so, but only
if we assume that Minnie is motivated by the desire to maximize her
material self-interest, in this case, her chances of being reelected.
Once we substitute utility for reelection maximizing in this situation,
any possibility of prediction is lost because her preferences cannot be
separated from her actions. If she refuses to change her position, we
can infer that she derived a decisive amount of utility from doing what
she regards as the right thing, keeping her campaign promises, or sim-
ply not submitting to political pressure. If she does change her posi-
tion, we cannot say that she has suffered a loss of utility because she
may have changed her preference. Resorting to the principle of in-
strumental rationality will not work in this context. If we assume that
Max is rational, we can be sure that his decrease in artichoke
purchases does not result from a short-term change in preferences,
because a price increase is irrelevant to his taste for artichokes. But
there is nothing irrational about changing one's preference in re-
behavior theory is interesting, but incomplete in light of recent scholarship suggesting that
social behavior is often determined by ritual or emotion. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PAS-
SIONS WITHIN REASON 7 (1988) (observing that "emotions often predispose us to behave in
ways that are contrary to our narrow interests").
76 The same analysis would apply to the motivation structure of a social movement's
leaders.
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sponse to a considered argument; indeed, the primary purpose of ar-
guments is to convince the listener to change her mind.77
We could, of course, ask Minnie what her initial preferences
were, but this raises all the problems that a theory of revealed prefer-
ences is designed to avoid. The person may not be sure about her
own preferences, and she may have an incentive-perhaps based on
material self-interest, perhaps based on some other motivation-to
conceal them. This is not a problem in Max's case, largely because we
can observe his actual behavior; in a commercial setting, one "puts
one's money where one's mouth is." More generally, material self-
interest maximizing is externally observable because one can measure
increases and decreases in a person's material well being. This holds
true for reelection maximizing as well; notwithstanding some complex
empirical questions, it is, at least in theory, the sort of goal that one
achieves by means of observable behaviors. As soon as we substitute a
capacious concept of utility that incorporates "doing the right thing"
or maintaining one's integrity, the possibility of external observation
disappears. Utility, or non-material well-being, is an internal state; the
only way to determine a person's level of non-material well-being is to
ask her.
A further reason why recognition of a broader range of interests
draws rational choice models into tautology is that there is no stop-
ping point, no way to exclude any conceivable human motivation
other than by what Green and Shapiro call "arbitrary domain restric-
tion."78 If our model allows people to be motivated by the desire for
prestige, why not allow them to be motivated by the desire to bring
happiness to others? If we allow them to be motivated by the desire
for power, why not allow them to be motivated by public interest?
Public choice scholars never advance theoretical, or even pragmatic
bases for these distinctions. Instead, they rely on two types of argu-
ments, both of which are illustrated by the public choice analysis of
judicial behavior. The first is flat denial. Thus, Richard Posner, in his
ongoing struggle to assimilate judicial behavior into his behavioral
model, concedes that judges are motivated by the desire for prestige,
power, leisure, and the pleasure of self-expression, but not by public
interest.79 Why? Because, according to Posner, "[t]o include in the
judicial utility function [the] desire to promote the public interest
77 The possibility that the listener might do so virtually defines Habermas's concept of
communicative action. See 2 JORGEN HABERMIAS, THE THEORY OF CoMmuNIcATIVE ACTION
4-5 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981).
78 GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 44-46.
79 POSNER, supra note 32, at 117-23. For a related critique of Posner's position, see
Neil S. Siegel, Sen and the Hart ofJurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis ofJudicial
Behavior, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1581 (1999).
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would be inconsistent with treating judges as 'ordinary' people."8 0 In
other words, ordinary people never engage in public-oriented behav-
ior, or more specifically, an ordinary person, given legal training, a
career in law, life tenure, and salary protection, would never engage
in such behavior. However, Posner offers no evidence for this remark-
able assertion; it is simply an appeal to the reader's intuition. Yet most
readers, I would guess, will find this idea highly counterintuitive.
The second argument for distinguishing between utility-maximiz-
ing and admirable behavior is recharacterization. At the beginning of
their analysis of judicial behavior, Shughart and Tollison concede
that:
[t] he economic analysis ofjudicial behavior fundamentally assumes
"that judges, like other people, seek to maximize a utility function
that includes both monetary and nonmonetary elements (the latter
including leisure, prestige, and power)." Not even the most imperi-
alistic of economists would argue that the private interests ofjudges
are the sole determinants ofjudicial decisions (i.e., that there is no
room for noneconomic explanations ofjudicial decision-making).81
Shughart and Tollison nonetheless declare that judicial behavior is
self-interested, and account for it in terms of judges' desire to create
"an opportunity for promotion," to "reduce the backlogs on their cal-
endars and ease their own workloads," and "to maximize their own
utility by imposing their preferences and values on society."82 These
selfish-sounding motivations, however, are mere recharacterizations of
the public-oriented motivations for judicial behavior that can be
found in a high school civics textbook: the desire to do a good job, to
administer the caseload efficiently, and to benefit society. What
makes them sound selfish is nothing more than the language that
Shughart and Tollison have used to describe them.
The title of this Symposium is thus well chosen. When public
choice scholars relinquish their empirically implausible claims of ma-
terial self-interest maximizing and acknowledge a broader range of
motivations, the only thing precluding them from recognizing more
admirable, less selfish impulses is their own commitment to cyni-
cism.813 Shughart and Tollison declare that "[c] ompletely 'selfless'
80 POSNER, supra note 32, at 118.
81 William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEo.
MASON L. REV. 953, 963 (1998) (quoting RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
505 (3d ed. 1986)).
82 Id. at 964.
83 'hile public choice seems to imply cynicism, it is important to guard against the
idea that the converse is necessarily true, namely that any cynical interpretation of official
behavior supports the public choice position. Many cynical positions conflict with this the-
ory. Of the seven deadly sins, for example, only two-avarice and gluttony-are fully con-
sonant with material self-interest maximizing. The others-envy, sloth, pride, lust, and
anger-are inconsistent with this principle. The mere fact that a legislator's behavior can
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models of judicial behavior are plainly nonscientific."8 4 But com-
pletely selfish models are equally unscientific, particularly when the
only demonstration of the judge's selfishness is the way the public
choice scholar characterizes his attitudes.
Another argument occasionally used to rescue public choice
from its empirical implausibility is that it provides us with the only
theory that promises to predict political behavior.85 Because predic-
tion is regarded as the highest form of knowledge, any theory with
predictive capabilities should be presumed to be correct and used to
generate as many predictions as the model can yield. Those areas
where the theory's predictions are confirmed will support valuable
scholarship; those areas where they are not confirmed, or where no
predictions can be generated, must be relegated to the netherworld of
the impartially or inadequately explained. This approach is referred
to above as presumptive public choice.
One difficulty with this argument is that it leads, once again, to
arbitrary domain restriction-that is, the exclusion of certain
problems from a general theory without any theoretical justification.8 6
The deeper problem with presumptive public choice is that it is self-
contradictory. The claim that prediction constitutes our highest form
of knowledge rests on a correspondence theory of truth, the assertion
that true statements are those that describe external reality in the
most accurate manner.87 Prediction is a test of empirical validity
within that overall approach. It cannot rescue a theory whose basic
premises fail the test of truth on which the value of prediction is
based. Astrology, phrenology, and alchemy also offer definitive pre-
dictions, but the invalidity of their premises, on correspondence
grounds, banishes them from the realm of scientific knowledge.
Their predictions, even if occasionally confirmed, are dismissable as
coincidence or concealed tautology. If public choice is based on an
empirically invalid approach to human behavior, its predictions, even
if confirmed, are similarly suspect. Nor can our desire for a predictive
theory in the political realm serve as a basis for rehabilitating public
choice on a presumptive basis. That would also violate the correspon-
dence theory of truth; in fact, it is the most extreme form of social
be attributed to clandestine and illicit motives does not mean that he is motivated by the
desire to maximize his material self-interest.
84 Id. at 963. Of course, no one subscribes to a "completely" selfless account of
legislators.
85 GREEN & SHAPiRo, supra note 14, at 44.
86 Id. at 44-46. The reason for this result is that areas in which predictions are discon-
firmed or no predictions can be formulated are unlikely to fit within a pattern that is itself
predicted by rational choice theory.
87 See ROBERT AUDI, EpIsTEMOLOGY:. A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCrION TO THE THEORY
OF KNOWLEDGE 214-17 (1998); HI..ARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HIsToRY 54-56
(1981).
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constructivism to assert that the truth value of a proposition is in-
creased because we desire the proposition to be true.
II
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF HuMAN BEHAVIOR
Husserl's phenomenology provides a model of human behavior
that can serve as an alternative to the microeconomic model and re-
solve the theory's epistemological and empirical difficulties. 88 I have
previously described his theory and its general application to legal be-
havior.8 9 For purposes of this discussion, the important feature of the
theory is the idea of individual and intersubjective meaning. Husserl
begins from the premise that every individual is enclosed within her
own experience of the world, which Husserl describes as the lifeworld.
All human thought and knowledge occurs within this individual expe-
rience. Although enclosed within their own lifeworlds, individuals are
not isolated from one another, but can communicate intersubjec-
tively.90 Such intersubjective communication is the source of cultural
continuity, but more importantly is also the source of the interpretive
structure that controls the individual's experience of the world and
makes high-level thinking possible. It is this simultaneous account of
human individuality and connectedness that gives phenomenology its
explanatory power. Phenomenology has a tendency to sound mystical
to people schooled in Anglo-American philosophy, and its transcen-
dental element-Husserl's epoche-merits this description. 91 But the
theory's account of individual experience and intersubjective commu-
nication is firmly grounded in the empirically observable world, and
has provided a methodology for a number of leading sociologists. 92
Because human beings are thinking creatures, their primary mo-
tivation, in Husserl's view, is the creation of meaning. At the momen-
tary level of perceived sensation, people use their interpretive
resources to make sense of these sensations and integrate them into
88 Husserl published three general introductions to phenomenology: EDMUND Hus-
SERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (Dorion Cairns
trans., M. Nihoff 1977) [hereinafter HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS]; EDMUND HUSSERL,
THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr
trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) [hereinafter HuSSERL, CRisis]; EDMUND HUSSERL,
IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PuRE PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., Hu-
manities Press 1969) [hereinafter HUSSERL, IDEAS].
89 Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1707-13 (1998) [hereinafter Rubin, Rational Actors]; Edward L.
Rubin, The Phenomenology of Contract: Complex Contracting in the Entertainment Industry, 152J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 123, 125-27 (1996).
90 HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 182-86.
91 See id. at 135-89; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 155-70.
92 E.g., AARON V. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968);
HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRES-
ENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
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unified impressions.93 Thus, our intersubjectively and experientially
developed understandings enable us to interpret certain perceptions
of differently shaped, differently colored objects as the same object
viewed from different angles and in different levels of illumination. 94
These understandings also enable us to recall past sensations and an-
ticipate future ones, which allows the sensations we immediately re-
ceive, and that occur at the thin margin between past and future, to
be integrated into a coherent impression of the world.95 At the more
abstract level, similar understandings enable us to comprehend enti-
ties or events that lie outside of our immediate experience. Ancient
Rome, World War I, and the motion picture industry all obtain their
identity and contours from our intersubjective process of interpreta-
tion. Without this interpretive process, and without its intersubjective
aspect, we would be unable to form any stable conception of these
remote entities and events. At an even more general level of our life
experience, we use our interpretive resources to create an account of
our lives, and perceive ourselves as unified beings who exist through
time, rather than as a locus of momentary and otherwise unconnected
interpretations. 96 We create a narrative of our lives and a sense of
directed purpose; we ascribe value to ideas, events, actions, achieve-
ments, and other human beings. All these levels of cognition-the
momentary one that enables us to make sense of perception, the
more abstract one that enables us to understand remote or abstract
entities, and the extensive one that enables us to make sense of our
lives-constitute the creation of meaning. We are motivated to create
meaning because each of us is an individual human being, enclosed in
his or her own lifeworld, who must live entirely within that lifeworld. 97
We are able to create meaning at the sophisticated level of modem
life, because we receive intersubjective communications that provide
us with the interpretive resources of a culture.
Weber's account of meaning is similar to Husserl's, but does not
include Husserl's epistemological or psychological explanation. For
93 HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 155-89; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 101-11;
see RUDOLF BERNET Er AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 115-40
(1993).
94 HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 117-21.
95 HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 88, at 31-43, 75-80; HUSSERL, CRISIS,
supra note 88, at 167-70; EDMUND HUSSERL, EXPERIENCE AND JUDGMENT 157-67 (Ludwig
Landgrebe ed.,James S. Churchill & Karl Ameriks trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1973).
96 This sociological level of meaning is explored in ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOME-
NOLOGY OF THE SoCIAL WORLD 45-96 (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., North-
western Univ. Press 1967).
97 Unless we transcend that world through the phenomenological epoche. See Hus-
SERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 135-37; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 155-57. Even so,
however, we remain within the lifeworld and simply perceive it, and ourselves, in a differ-
ent way.
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Weber, meaning is the most basic sociological concept, the first term
he discusses at the beginning of Economy and Society. While he does not
explicitly define the term, he treats it as the self-understanding of the
individual, the subjective process by which the individual relates to the
world. 98 The field of sociology, which includes political science in
Weber's usage, is defined in terms of this subjective meaning. It is,
according to Weber, the science of interpreting social action. "We
shall speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual attaches a sub-
jective meaning to his behavior-be it overt or covert, omission or
acquiescence. Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning takes
account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its
course." 99 Subjective meaning need not be the result of a rational
process, but values rationality is necessarily based on the actor's ability
to evaluate, and orient herself toward, the meaning of her actions. 00
Husserl and Weber thus offer meaning-based theories of social
behavior, also described as interpretive or hermeneutic.10 1 This con-
stitutes the dominant theme in modern social science, 10 2 with struc-
turalism and rational actor theory playing subordinate roles.10 3 In
98 WEBER, supra note 19, at 4-5.
99 Id. at 4.
100 For discussions of Weber's interpretivism, see KARL LO6iTH, MAX WEBER AND KARL
MARX 28-67 (Tom Bottomore & William Outhwaite eds., Hans Fantel trans., George Allen
& Unwin 1982); FIUTz RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY 92-121 (1997).
101 See, e.g., SCHUTZ, supra note 96, at 7-10.
102 Interpretive approaches to social science are predominant in anthropology, see
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS,
FIELDS, AND METAPHORS (1974); in sociology, seeJEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THEORETICAL LOGIC
IN SOCIOLOGY (1982-83); RANDALL COLLINS, CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY (1975); in social theory,
seeANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY (1979); and in political theory,
see STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY (1991); JEAN L. COHEN & AN-
DREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE
TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1974).
A large proportion of the leading social and political theorists of our era are heavily or
predominantly interpretivist in orientation. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDI-
TION (1958); PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1990);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY (1991); GoFFMAN, supra note 92;
HABERMAS, supra note 77; NIKLAs LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz, Jr. trans.,
1995); TOURAINE, supra note 6. For general discussions of these developments, see PETER
L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, TH4E SocIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (Anchor Books
ed. 1967) (1966); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983);
METATHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (Donald W. Fiske & Richard A. Shweder eds., 1986); PETER
WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE (1958).
103 SeeJAMES F. HARMS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992). Harris offers a defense of "mod-
ernism," or the idea that objective truth exists, and can be perceived by human beings. His
defense begins thus:
It may well be that the second half of the twentieth century will be known to
future scholars as The Age of Relativism or The Age of Post-Modernism.
The attacks upon "classical" or "modernistic" thinking have come from so
many sources and from so many different traditions that just keeping up
with all the multifarious forms of relativism has become an almost impossi-
ble burden .... One factor which explains why there are so few people
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legal academia, however, rational actor theory, and specifically public
choice, appears to be the most prevalent theme. The two themes are
not easy to compare, since most of the social theories derived from
Husserl's phenomenology seem quite removed from public choice.
Ironically, however, Husserl's theory in its original form bears a de-
cided resemblance to public choice, although the two theories diverge
at a crucial point. This overlap provides a useful basis for comparison
and thus serves as a justification for going back to the source of phe-
nomenology, rather than invoking one of the more familiar social the-
ories derived from it.
Like microeconomic and legal public choice theory, the phenom-
enological model relies on methodological individualism to solve the
macro-micro problem. 10 4 Both approaches reject the idea that collec-
tives can be treated as independent actors, and regard an explanation
as complete only if it accounts for institutional behavior in terms of
individual action. 10 5 In microeconomics, however, this is simply an
unexplained assumption, while phenomenology derives this principle
from the basic epistemological claim that all thought and action is
primordially grounded in individual experience. 10 6
This is an appealing epistemological premise, because it dis-
penses with the vagueness and mysticism that infect theories of the
general will or of emergent entities. Theories of a general will tend to
be truly mystical; one thinks of the divine right of monarchy,10 7 of
Rousseau's argument that "sovereignty is purely and simply the exer-
cise of the general will," and "the sovereign is purely and simply a
collective being, and can be represented therefore only by itself,"108
and of Hegel's conception of the state as "the actuality of the ethical
Idea[,] ... ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed
to itself, knowing and thinking itself."10 9 Theories that postulate
emergent entities are usually more restrained, but they suffer from a
similarly vague and open-ended quality. One can attribute a wide
range of attitudes and behaviors to "Congress," or "the nation," or
"the environmental movement," but one can never confirm these at-
rushing in to pick up the fallen banner of reason and method is that the
relativists have succeeded in attaching a very negative connotation to any
form of non-relativism.
Id. at 1-2.
104 See Rubin, Rational Actors, supra note 89, at 1717.
105 Id.
106 HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 94-95.
107 ROBERT FILI.ER, PATRIARCHA: OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS (1680); THE POLITI-
CAL WORKS OFJAMES I 272 (Charles Howard Mcllwain ed., Russell & Russell 1965) (1616).
108 JEANJACQUEs RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAaCr bk. II, ch. 1, at 33-34 (Willmoore
Kendall trans., 1954).
109 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 257, at 80 (T.M.
Knox trans., Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc. 1971) (1952).
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tributions by questioning one of these entities or observing its defini-
tive behaviors. While we need to use such terms as a linguistic
shorthand, treating them as independently existing actors raises epis-
temological difficulties. It seems preferable to dispense with them, as
both public choice and phenomenology recommend.110 This prefer-
ence, however, should only be indulged if one can develop plausible
solutions to the macro-micro problem that explain the enormous im-
portance and complexity of institutions on the basis of individual
action.
The phenomenological model is also consistent with the
microeconomic model in treating human beings as essentially rational
creatures. Phenomenology's concept of rationality is much broader
than the microeconomic concept of instrumental rationality, but cer-
tainly incorporates the idea. In fact, phenomenology links instrumen-
tal rationality at the action, or life experience level, to experience at
the momentary level in a manner that extends well beyond rational
choice theory. According to Husserl, perception itself is a conscious
act, not a passive receipt of sensory information."1 To be sure, a per-
son who is awake is flooded with sensations. But to perceive an object
as an object, rather than merely having light waves impinge on one's
eyes or sound waves on one's ears, one must intend the object, that is,
one must interpret it in a purposive manner.11 2 This is, in effect, a
form of instrumental rationality. When we experience a particular
collection of light waves and sound waves, we interpret the bundle of
sensory signals as a cat, because this interpretation is part of the way
we make sense of the world. In other words, the way we perceive the
world around us is instrumental to our desire to make sense of that
world, to create meaning for ourselves. 1 3 Of course, instrumental ra-
tionality at this momentary level is much more automatic than the
rational consideration of alternatives that occurs at the general, or life
experience level. The point is not to claim that the two are equivalent
or indistinguishable. But they do possess a structural similarity in phe-
nomenology, and this structure suggests the reason that people are
instrumentally rational. It is a general stance toward the world
110 For example, one could say that "the United States expressed its disapproval of
French policy today," and that may be enough for many purposes. Yet that might not be
what really happened. What might have happened was that the President, after consulting
with his advisors, made a phone call to the United States Ambassador in France, instructed
the Ambassador to go to the office of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and deliver a
particular message, and the Ambassador proceeded to do so. This might become impor-
tant if we later learn that a majority of American citizens, another group for which "the
United States" serves as a linguistic shorthand, did not agree with the President's decision.
11I HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 155-60.
112 See HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 101-32.
113 See HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 168.
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around us, a way in which we think, and it emerges from our basic
nature as conscious, purposive creatures.
Because they share the epistemological premise of methodologi-
cal individualism, both phenomenology and microeconomics agree
that the instrumental rationality of human beings is limited. In other
words, people must function with limited knowledge, within limited
time, and with limited cognitive abilities. Phenomenology, however,
also accommodates bounded rationality, that is, impaired decision-
making of the sort discussed by Simon and Williamson. 114 While in-
strumental rationality is a general orientation toward life, it exists
within individual experience. That experience also includes emotion,
fatigue, inattentiveness, laziness, and other nonrational features that
can impair or redirect instrumental decisionmaking. n 5 There is sim-
ply no reason to assume that instrumental rationality, which is based
on the desire to achieve optimal results, will supersede these other
feelings, although it may win out in particular situations.
Thus, phenomenology agrees with rational choice theory about
both the epistemological premise of methodological individualism
and the behavioral premise of instrumental rationality. It diverges
from public choice theory, however, with respect to public choice's
second behavioral premise; namely that people are motivated by self-
interest, material or otherwise. As stated above, phenomenology
holds that, people are motivated by the desire to create meaning at
the momentary, abstract, and life experience levels. 1 6 At the momen-
tary level, they interpret sensory impressions in a purposive manner,
intending objects as comprehensible, intersubjectively learned entities
in order to make sense of the world around them."17 At the more
abstract level, they combine these momentary interpretations into
meaning-laden generalities, such as France, or justice, or morality. At
the level of their life experience, they make decisions so that their life
will be meaningful to them." 8 Sometimes, what is most meaningful is
to maximize their material well-being; more often, however, it is to
maximize the material well-being of themselves and their children. In
other situations, what is most meaningful is to serve God, to serve
114 SIMON, supra note 27, at 39-41; WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 4-7, 75-76, 253-58.
115 See, e.g., ANTONIO R- DAuAsio, DEscARTEs' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HurstaN BRAIN 131-64 (1994); ANTONIO R. DAMAsIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS 42-49
(1999); FRANK, supra note 75, at 51-56.
116 See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
117 There is no conflict between this theory of perception and public choice. The fact
that the world is interpreted, as Husserl and Heidegger suggest, rather than objectively
perceived, is simply a different informational starting point that serves equally well as a
basis for instrumentally rational action. Nonetheless, there is an epistemological advan-
tage to a theory of motivation at the life experience level that is unified with the process of
perception at the instantaneous level.
118 ScHUtz, supra note 96, at 45-96.
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one's country, to become famous, to experience adventure, to prove
one's masculinity or femininity, to help others, or to inflict pain on
amphibians.
At the empirical level, this is a much more plausible theory of
human motivation. The point is not merely that human behavior is
multivariant, as Etzioni and others have argued, 1 9 but that phenome-
nology provides a unified theory of behavior that accounts for the per-
ceived variations in a plausible manner. In particular, it accounts for
many observed behaviors that theories of self-interest maximizing find
inexplicable.
To begin at the simplest level, the most grasping, selfish, material
self-interest maximizers generally are maximizing their income for the
sake of their family, not merely for themselves. That is, they share
income with family members in a manner that is not fully explicable
by the idea that they are maximizing their personal well-being. Bal-
zac's Old Goriot, impoverishing himself to send money to his adult
daughter, is an extreme portrait, but hardly an unrecognizable one. 120
Many people limit their expenditures so that they can leave money to
their children after they die. To conclude that the well-being of one's
nuclear family members is part of a person's own well-being concedes
that people derive subjective benefit from aiding others. This is the
same instinct that leads people to sacrifice material resources to bene-
fit their extended family, their friends, their co-religionists, their na-
tion, or the disadvantaged. As already described, the micro-
economists' assertion that people derive utility from these sacrifices of
material well-being is quasi-tautological.' 21 It abandons the predict-
ability of a true self-interest model without gaining any compensating
advantage. The term "utility" tells us nothing about people's subjec-
tive motivations, the reason why people make such sacrifices, or what
it feels like to behave in this manner. What does explain these behav-
iors is the concept of meaning. People seek the well-being of their
family or friends because doing so is meaningful and contributes to
the way they view themselves and the purpose of their life.
Similarly, the reason people engage in altruistic behavior by giv-
ing money to charity, or donating millions of dollars to their alma
mater in exchange for a bronze plaque in a dimly lit hallway, is that it
creates meaning for them.122 Even pathologically self-centered peo-
ple will often exchange material resources for power or fame, while
119 See Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159,
159-60 (1986).
120 HONORt DE BALZAC, OLD GORIOT (Marion Ayton Crawford trans., Penguin Books
1951).
121 See MUELLER, supra note 9, at 351.
122 See DAVID COLLARD, ALTRUISM AND ECONOMY 3-5 (1978); KRISTEN R- MONROE, THE
HEART OF ALTRUISM (1996).
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normal people will exchange material resources for aesthetic or lifes-
tyle benefits that are more meaningful to them.123 More importantly,
individuals will often carry out their assigned roles in a conscientious
manner, rather than try to maximize any personal advantage, because
they want their lives, and the work that constitutes a large part of their
lives, to be meaningful.
An important test for any theory of human motivation is whether
the proponents of the theory would be willing to apply it to them-
selves. Most public choice scholarship is produced by tenured faculty
at academic institutions.' 24 Why do these professors work so hard to
publish this material instead of maximizing their leisure, or earning
extra income through non-academic work? Why do more professors
not offer high grades and recommendations in exchange for money
or sex? The most plausible explanation is that they strive to be good
scholars and good teachers, they believe in what they write, and they
believe that their recommendations will advance the careers of worthy
students. In other words, they want to perform their role in a manner
that gives meaning to their efforts and their lives.
In the political arena, explanations predicated on meaning are
considerably more plausible than those based on self-interest maxi-
mizing. Consider the four examples given above: voting, social move-
ment participation, legislative behavior, and judicial behavior. 125
People vote because it is meaningful for them to perform their civic
duty. If it is not meaningful, if they are disaffected from or hostile to
their country, they will tend not to vote. Moreover, they cast their
votes on the basis of their preferences, their overall sense of who they
are and what they like.
Participants in social movements are even more obviously moti-
vated by ideology, particularly in those movements that are uncon-
nected with their personal well-being.' 26  Some public choice
accounts suggest that they are being manipulated by the leaders of
these movements, for whom the movement represents a path to mate-
rial rewards. Once again, however, people with the leadership abili-
ties of the magnitude needed to mobilize people in this manner
probably could be given more utility in a more settled profession.
The argument, moreover, applies only in a nation like the United
123 These motivations are entirely inconsistent with a behavioral model of material self-
interest. They can be incorporated into a model of more general self-interest or utility, but
only at the expense of making the entire model tautological. See supra note 74 and accom-
panying text. The desire for meaning is a more direct, intuitively plausible account of such
motivations. It provides some content to the account that can be related to other psycho-
logical events, and is at least partially verifiable.
124 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 12, at 3-9.
125 See supra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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States, where dissent is tolerated and often rewarded. In other na-
tions, people who lead social movements are often risking their liveli-
hoods or their lives.
Elected legislators concededly try to maximize their chance of re-
election, but why do they do so? Not to maximize their material re-
sources-most of them had much greater income earning potential in
the private-sector position that they relinquished to run for office. In
fact, a recent development, decried by many, are the plutocrats like
Ross Perot, Stephen Forbes, or John Corzine, who expend vast
amounts of their personal fortune in an effort to obtain elected office.
The reason people seek these offices is to become famous, to exercise
power, or to implement their ideology-namely to fulfill their per-
sonal desire for meaning. Similarly, judges are motivated by the de-
sire to act conscientiously in the role that they have assumed.
Contrary to Posner's assertion, this is exactly what ordinary people do
in many different roles. 127 Similar to legislators, judges undoubtedly
use their authority to implement their own ideology to a certain ex-
tent.128 But such a motivation, far from being inconsistent with pub-
lic-interested behavior is indistinguishable from that behavior in most
people's minds. 129 An individual would need to be demonic or per-
verse to maintain an ideology that conflicted with her own conception
of the public interest.
In addition to resolving these specific empirical dilemmas that
bedevil public choice theory, the phenomenological model explains
more general aspects of political activity. Among these are the dis-
course of governmental actors, the attitudes of citizens toward govern-
ment, and the impact of government on citizens.
127 This is a virtually unchallenged position in modem sociology. See, e.g., PETER M.
BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS (1962); GARFINKEL, supra note 92;
GOFFMAN, supra note 92. With respect to legal roles, see HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS,
AND JUSTICE 305-08 (3d ed. 1993); NIK-As LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW
49-61 (Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., Martin Albrow ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul
1985).
128 The most common view among political scientists is that judges are policymakers,
and that their primary motivation is to confer benefits upon society. See, e.g., LAWRENCE
BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 290-92 (4th ed. 1998); LEE EPSTEIN &JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE
SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 3-5 (1992); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin aDemoc-
raty: Tle Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAw 279, 293-95 (1957). Of
course, this is regarded by many legal scholars, to the extent that it is true, as a breach of
the judge's true duty, which is to follow the law. See RONALD DWOREmN, LAW's EMPIRE 114
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-85 (1984). The point is
that most political scientists, in contrast to public choice scholars, see judges, like legisla-
tors, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, as being strongly motivated by ideology and
public-oriented concern.
129 For phenomenologically based accounts ofjudicial behavior, see MALCOLM M. FEE-
LEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 204-96 (1998);
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997).
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With respect to political discourse, no elected official admits that
he made a particular decision because it will help him get reelected,
and few lobbyists present their arguments to legislators in terms of
naked political advantage. Rather, both officials and lobbyists speak
in terms of the general benefit that will accrue to the citizenry in gen-
eral. Public choice scholars may dismiss discourse as irrelevant, but
that dismissal results from pre-analytic assumptions, not from any well-
articulated theory. Moreover, even if discourse is irrelevant to the leg-
islator's exercise of his principal authority, it is undoubtedly a behav-
ior that requires some explanation. In addition, public choice fails to
explain how public officials understand their role and feel about their
actions. Again, this may be deemed irrelevant to their decisions, but it
nonetheless requires an explanation. A theory that focuses on how
people create meaning responds to these concerns by accounting for
both their discourse and their understanding.
With respect to ordinary citizens, phenomenology suggests that
political attitudes and behaviors are part of a general process by which
individuals create lives that have meaning for them. Because phe-
nomenology relies on methodological individualism, it does not claim
that the individual's relationship with the state is qualitatively differ-
ent from her relationship with other individuals or institutions. This
is an epistemological advantage because it enables the observer to
base the assessment of the individual's relationship to the state on a
general pattern of behavior, rather than forcing him to invent a new
and specifically political psychology for this purpose. But phenome-
nology, unlike public choice, admits the entire range of human moti-
vation and behavior into the equation. The individual can love or
hate the government, just as she loves or hates other people. She can
feel loyalty or disaffection, gratitude or resentment, approval or disap-
proval. Moreover, because of the enormous capacity of human beings
to create meaningful accounts of their behavior, the individual can
simultaneously feel opposing emotions, either at different times in
her life or toward different components of the state. Thus, the phe-
nomenological model explains why a corporate executive who favors
severe punishment for violent crime can advise her company to violate
a safety regulation, or why people who volunteer to fight for their
country come home and cheat on their taxes.
Third, the phenomenological model explains the government's
effect on individuals in a way that public choice cannot. While public
choice may seem like a hard-headed theory, it contains a strong ele-
ment of wishful thinking and wistful sentimentality. This resides in its
implicit assertion that people, being motivated solely by material self-
interest, are essentially identical in that they know what they want, and
their wants are relatively stable. Were this true, it would be reassuring,
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as it implies that people will always maintain a wary, critical distance
from government, and resist its more oppressive incarnations when-
ever possible. But, as the lugubrious history of the last two centuries
attests, government is sometimes able to induce unquestioning obedi-
ence among its citizens, leading them into material ruin and personal
destruction.' 30 It is often able to obtain at least moderate levels of
self-sacrifice because each individual's perception of the world and
system of values is fashioned from intersubjectively communicated in-
formation. In the end, every person must create his own life's mean-
ing, as an individual experience. But for many people, some outside
force that plays a particularly decisive role in constructing their system
of values or sense of reality dominates their personal sense of mean-
ing. The government, given its ideological and communicative re-
sources, is often such a force.
While the phenomenological model recognizes the enormous
impact of the state on the values, understanding, and ultimately the
personality structure of the individual, it does not ally itself with theo-
ries such as structuralism that eliminate the individual and attribute
all human behavior to the operation of social norms or historically
generated forces. Because people are rational creatures motivated by
the desire to create meaning for themselves, they always retain some
capacity to engage in individualized thought and action and to reject
intersubjectively established norms. In some cases, this divergent be-
havior consists of mere peculiarity and results in the individual's social
ostracism. In other cases, it consists of material self-interest maximiz-
ing and allows the individual to gain some political or economic ad-
vantage over others. The phenomenological model of behavior is
thus situated midway between individualistic accounts that dissolve the
state into a series of ad hoc alliances, and the structuralist accounts
that dissolve the individual into a locus for the operation of large-scale
forces.
This account of the individual is directly connected to the phe-
nomenological solution to the macro-micro problem. Like public
choice and rational actor theories in general, phenomenology
originates from the premise that all thought lies within the ambit of
individual experience.131 In the phenomenological model, however,
that experience includes the intersubjective communications that re-
flect both human connectivity and the continuity of culture. Through
their interactions with each other, people develop similar ways of
thinking and similar emotional commitments. Such intersubjective
coordination can resemble the temporary alliance of self-interested
130 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 303-479 (rev. ed. 1973);
CZESIAW MILosz, THE CAPTIVE MIND (Jane Zielonko trans., Knopf 1953).
131 See HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 94-95.
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parties, but it can also run very deep, because our interpretation of
the world that we experience and the structure of our thinking
processes are determined by these intersubjective understandings. In
the political realm, this coordination process explains how institutions
acquire a permanence that makes them a force of nature, as opposed
to the product of separate individuals. It also explains how social
movements can mobilize separate and diffuse interests into coordi-
nated action without the policing mechanisms that public choice de-
mands. While the individual actors remain separate, each individual
will have within her mind a set of understandings and commitments
to the institution or the movement. She will think in institutional or
movement terms, and thus act in coordination with others who share
the same understanding and commitments.
Ultimately, these intersubjective understandings give substance,
and are the only thing that give substance, to a human institution. In
many cases, these understandings are supported by the external cor-
relative of buildings, furniture, and written records. But if people's
intersubjective understanding changes and they lose their commit-
ment to the institution, the buildings will be abandoned, the furniture
used for firewood, and the records discarded as irrelevant debris. In
contrast, many important institutions have few external correlatives
and exist primarily in people's minds. When social movements begin,
they are little more than intersubjective understandings; physical as-
sets generally come later, and their ultimate scale is usually a poor
guide to the movement's real strength.
By adopting this theory of motivation and institutional creation
in place of material self-interest maximizing, the phenomenological
model necessarily relinquishes public choice theory's aspiration to
predict human behavior. However, this is not a serious sacrifice for at
least two reasons. 132 First, prediction is not as important as public
choice scholars assert. The claim that prediction constitutes our high-
est form of knowledge rests on a correspondence theory of truth-the
assertion that true statements are those that describe external reality
in the most accurate manner.133 Prediction is a test of empirical valid-
ity within that overall approach. It cannot be used to validate a theory
whose basic premises fail the test of truth on which the value of pre-
132 Once the sacrifice is made, it undermines the presumptive argument for public
choice. This argument, noted at the outset, is that public choice provides us with the only
theory that promises to predict political behavior. Any theory that claims predictive power
should be presumed correct, and used to generate as many predictions as it can yield.
Those areas where the theory's predictions are confirmed will then be known to us; those
areas where they are not confirmed, or where no predictions can be generated, must be
relegated to the netherworid of the impartially or inadequately explained.
133 SeeAUDI, supra note 87, at 214-44; RicHARD RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE 131-39 (1980).
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diction is based. As stated earlier, astrology, phrenology, and alchemy
also offer definitive predictions, but the invalidity of their premises,
on either correspondence or consensus grounds, banishes them from
the realm of scientific knowledge. Their predictions, even if occasion-
ally confirmed, must be dismissed as coincidence or concealed
tautology.134
Second, the search for a predictive theory must be chimerical if
human behavior is truly unpredictable. We are compelled to relin-
quish our aspiration for prediction if we cannot develop an empiri-
cally convincing model that achieves it. As stated above, this is in fact
the case. Public choice, our only theory of political behavior that
claims to generate verifiable predictions, is not an empirical success.
While it successfully predicts certain political behaviors, too many of
its predictions have been disconfirmed.
Phenomenology adds an epistemological argument to the empiri-
cal argument against predictability. Because all thought is contained
within individual experience, the subject in the human sciences is op-
erating at the same level of complexity as the observer,( or potential
predictor. At one level, this means that the academic must always sim-
plify by describing 'less than the totality of the situation and supple-
menting that description with approximations and interpretations. At
another level, it means that subjects will sometimes be influenced to
adapt these theories to their own purposes, thus inevitably disrupting
their predictions.13 5
III
INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION AND THE IMAGE OF THE
MODERN STATE
The phenomenological theory of behavior asserts that motiva-
tions other than self-interest maximizing control much of human be-
havior, but does not deny that self-interested behavior occurs. The
claim, rather, is that people will engage in self-interested behavior
134 NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FoREcAST (3d ed. 1973) (stating that predic-
tions can be confirmed even if they violate correspondence theory to a certain extent);
CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 3-46 (1966) (observing that partial
confirmation of hypothesis by date does not prove its truth according to a correspondence
theory); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-110 (2d ed.
1970) (concluding that rejected paradigms continue to explain many observed phenom-
ena, according to a consensus theory of truth); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENIFIC
DISCOVERY 273-81 (1959) (observing that partial confirmation of hypothesis by date does
not prove its truth according to a correspondence theory); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A
HUMAN FACE 80-95 (James Conant ed., 1990) (noting that factual findings do not prove
causal structure of science).
135 Annelise Riles, Public Choice Hits the Market "Corruption" and "Rationality" in
the Design of a Central Bank's Payment System (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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when they find it meaningful to do so. This will often be the case;
while some people are ascetic, and others are dutiful or self-sacrificial,
most people enjoy life's sensual pleasures and are readily able to in-
corporate that enjoyment into their self-image. In a commercial soci-
ety such as our own, income maximizing carries an additional value,
for we regard such behavior as a model of civic virtue and a valuable
way of contributing to society. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is writ-
ten as a moral justification of income-maximizing behavior,1 36 and its
familiar argument that private enterprise produces public wealth
through the operation of an "invisible hand" is widely accepted and
highly regarded. Thus, the phenomenological model, while it recog-
nizes other motivations, fully acknowledges the importance of self-in-
terest maximizing and might well conclude that it is the single greatest
source of personal meaning in a secular society like our own.
Given this recognition, it might appear that the phenomenologi-
cal model would only amend, rather than reject, public choice theory
as it is used in legal scholarship. That is, the theory might be seen as
insisting that some political behavior must be explained in other
terms, but acknowledge that much of it can be explained by rational
self-interest maximizing. Yet this is not the case; the phenomenologi-
cal model of behavior represents a challenge to public choice theory
in its entirety. It demands that the entire idea of self-interest maximiz-
ing be set within a phenomenological framework based on meaning.
Within the political realm, there are two closely related reasons
for this approach. First, theories of human motivation not only deter-
mine the method of assessing people's attitude toward their personal
relations, but also toward remote events and institutions, such as polit-
ical developments and the state. Second, one's theory of motivation
not only determines one's assessment of people's behavior at the
micro level-how they manage their personal lives-but also one's as-
sessment of people's behavior at the macro level-how they join to-
gether to create institutions such as the state or its components.' 37
In fact, the connection between micro and macro behavior is
more crucial for public choice and phenomenology than for other
theories because these two theories share the premise of methodologi-
cal individualism, and thus deny the existence of intervening forces,
such as emergent collectivities, between the micro and macro levels.
The result is that, for both the public choice scholar and the phenom-
enologist, her theory of human motivation fully determines her un-
136 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURtE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Regnery Pub'g, Inc. 1998) (1896).
137 JAMiES S. CoLEmAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SocIAL THEORY 21-23 (1990); MACRO-MICRO
LINKAGES IN SocIoLocr (Joan Huber ed., 1991); THE MICRO-MAcRO LINK (Jeffrey C. Alex-
ander et al. eds., 1987); SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 9-44; Collins, supra note 7.
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derstanding of the way people perceive political institutions and the
way those institutions are created. Taken together, these factors com-
prise the scholar's own image of the state. For the most part, this
image will be informed by her beliefs about the way the state was cre-
ated and the way it is perceived by citizens. That image, in turn, un-
derlies virtually all political analysis. Thus, if public choice has the
theory of human motivation wrong, as argued above, it is likely to have
a distorted image of the state. The result is that the entire theory is
premised on a misconception. It is a baby that is best discarded, and
the bathwater of its empirical conclusions should be reinterpreted
within a phenomenological framework.
Public choice's misconception is best illustrated by considering its
approach to the administrative state within our own country, not only
because that system is of particular concern to us, but also because it is
the system to which public choice theory has devoted the majority of
its attention.1 38 The administrative state is characterized by extensive
and self-conscious government regulation of the economic and social
relations of its citizens. This regulation is implemented by administra-
tive agencies, famously characterized by Weber as hierarchical organi-
zations with designated jurisdiction, salaried employees, and
continuous records.' 39 An administrative state can exhibit a variety of
political forms; while it cannot be a traditional monarchy or a direct
democracy, it can potentially span the entire range from totalitarian-
ism through autocracy to representative democracy. The present dis-
cussion can be limited to Western democratic governments.
Because public choice theory is based on the premise that people
are motivated by the desire to maximize their self-interest, it asserts
that this same motivation determines their relationship to the state.
Thus, all people view the modern state as an impediment to their abil-
ity to engage in self-interest maximizing behavior. In addition, many
people view the state as a source of benefits by which they can increase
their material self-interest. These benefits may take the form of trans-
fer payments, 40 a good job, an economic subsidy for their business, or
a regulation that grants them a rent or discomforts their competitors.
Individuals will organize themselves into interest groups to seek such
138 See, e.g., MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964); HENRYJACOBY,
THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Eveline L. Kanes trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1973).
This account of the modem state is widely accepted, and not a point of contention be-
tween public choice and other theories.
139 WEBER, supra note 19, at 956-58.
140 Need-based transfer payments are typically described as benefits, but the term
"benefit" will be used here to describe any advantage that can be secured from the state.
342 [Vol. 87:309
PUBLIC CHOICE, PENOMENOLOGY
benefits,14 1 just as they will affirmatively avoid the intrusion on their
autonomy that results from other state activities. Of course, because
public choice argues only that their motivations are limited, and not
their intellect, they will be fully aware that their wealth is not only
maximized by their own self-interested behavior, but also by govern-
mental intervention to enforce contracts, provide police, and protect
the country from foreign invasion. However, this awareness will not
lead to either behavioral or attitudinal consequences. Fully willing to
free-ride on these governmental programs, they will neither contrib-
ute to them nor comply with their requirements unless they are com-
pelled to do so by the imposition of sanctions that impose penalties
greater than the costs of contribution or compliance.
Given these attitudes, public choice theory resolves the macro-
micro problem by concluding that the modem administrative state is
created by interest group efforts to extract benefits from the state.' 42
Each new agency or program is the product of a different coalition's
efforts. Organized labor obtains protective legislation and a Depart-
ment of Labor is created; farmers obtain agricultural price supports
and the Department of Agriculture increases in size; veterans band
together to obtain pensions and subsidized medical care, thereby gen-
erating the Veterans Administration. The only groups that can organ-
ize to secure these benefits are those that can solve the free-rider
problem.' 43 Because these groups are generally small and have clearly
defined economic interests, the government becomes a map of the
successful special interests and operates to the detriment of the
majority.
Other public choice explanations for the growth of the adminis-
trative state display a similar character. William Niskanen argues that
the modern state has grown in size because administrators continually
strive to maximize their budgets. 144 Morris Fiorina suggests that legis-
lators enact regulatory programs so that they can grant exemptions to
powerful constituents ("casework") and thus obtain their support in
the next election. 45 According to Samuel Peltzman, the growth of
government results from the desire of politicians to obtain votes by
creating redistributive programs. 146 Numerous other public choice
141 E.g., David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups: Money, Information, and Influence, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 12, at 296, 320-21; John R. Wright, PAC Contribu-
tions, Lobbying and Representation, 51 J. POL. 713, 713-16 (1989).
142 See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1, 32-52 (1982); Dennis C. Mueller & Peter Murrell, Interest Groups and the Size of Govern-
ment, 48 PUB. CHOICE 125, 126-27 (1986).
143 See OLsON, supra note 23, at 9-16.
144 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BURE.AUCRACv AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 114
(1971).
145 MoRRs P. FIORrNA, CONGRESS 42-43 (2d ed. 1989).
146 Sam Peltzman, The Growth of Government, 23 J.L. & ECON. 209, 285-87 (1980).
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scholars assert that bureaucrats can perpetrate "fiscal illusions" by sys-
tematically deceiving legislators and voters about the true costs of ad-
ministrative programs.1 47
With respect to administrators, the officials who give the adminis-
trative state its particular character, public choice offers a variety of
accounts. The best known is probably Niskanen's, described just
above, which is that administrators attempt to maximize their agency's
budget.148 There are obvious empirical difficulties with this position,
most notably the fact that bureaucrats do not try to maximize their
agency's budget. 149 Migu6 and B6langer have suggested that bureau-
crats instead try to maximize their discretionary budgets, or budgetary
slack. 150 But this theory succumbs to the observation by Miller and
Moe that efforts by administrators to extract funds from the legisla-
ture could hardly proceed the way that Niskanen or Migu6 and Bdlan-
ger envisioned, given that the legislature is the agency's structural
superior and is filled with politically sophisticated individuals. 151 As
Moe notes in a subsequent survey, this insight led to a series of public
choice and positive political theory analyses that treat both legislators
and administrators as strategic actors in a complex interaction. 152
This public choice theory of the modern state's creation and
growth is an unconvincing description of people's attitudes, and an
equally unconvincing solution to the macro-micro problem. To begin
with, the explanations that public choice offers regarding the atti-
tudes of ordinary citizens are akin to conspiracy theories; they imply
that people are constantly being fooled, and that they have unknow-
ingly voted for and supported the massive growth of an administrative
state over a period of two hundred years when they derive no benefits
from it.153 But is it possible for rational human beings truly to be
147 See Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in
TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM 65, 65 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988).
148 NISKANEN, supra note 144, at 114.
149 See Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECrVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE, supra note 12, at 455, 459.
150 Jean-Luc Migu6 & Gerard Blanger, Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion,
17 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27-29 (1974).
151 GaryJ. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government, 77
AM. POL. SCL REv. 297, 308-09 (1983).
152 Moe, supra note 149, at 459-60.
153 Peltzman's theory of governmental growth, see Peltzman, supra note 146, at 285-87,
is something of an exception, because he asserts that politicians offer redistributive pro-
grams to obtain votes. However, this theory is not borne out empirically. See ROBERT H.
FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995). Moreover, as Mueller
points out, it is difficult to see why the process of redistribution requires a particularly large
government, see MUELLER, supra note 9, at 330-31; a tax authority and a police force should
be sufficient. In fact, most of the institutions that lend bulk to modern government, such
as the armed forces, the educational system, the criminal justice system, and the regulatory
agencies, are not redistributive in any direct way. The legislation behind all these institu-
tions benefits some people at the expense of others, as does any governmental program.
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fooled for this long, and this extensively? Can one of the most signifi-
cant developments in the history of the world really be attributed to
an elaborate hoax?
Second, it is not clear that public choice theory offers any expla-
nation at all for the macrophenomenon of the administrative state.
While some administrative institutions may be plausibly attributed to
special interest pressures, many cannot. Environmental protection
agencies, for example, undoubtedly were created as a result of politi-
cal pressure by environmental groups. But how did social movements
representing such diffuse interests coalesce? An independent judici-
ary and an independent central bank are widely regarded as good
public policy, but what special interests created them?154
Finally, the public choice account of administrative behavior suf-
fers from the same defect as its account of legislative and judicial be-
havior: it ignores the widely recognized observation that most people
want to fulfill their assigned role in a conscientious manner.155 Moe's
description of bureaucratic behavior in strategic terms avoids this
problem, but does not depend upon the behavioral assumptions of
public choice. Conscientious administrators will engage in strategic
behavior of the sort Moe describes on behalf of their agency and the
policies that their agency supports.1 56
The phenomenological model of behavior provides a different,
and ultimately more convincing image of the modem administrative
But unless those benefited are the poor majority at the expense of the rich minority, we are
back to the conspiracy theory that the majority is being systematically misled.
154 For an explanation of the development of independent central banks in public
choice terms, see Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998). Miller acknowledges that the independence of central banks,
which is increasingly common in the industrialized world, is desirable social policy. Id. at
433-34. The difficulty, however, is that Miller's thesis is only persuasive if one begins with
a pre-empirical belief that a government program could not possibly result from conscien-
tious efforts by public officials.
155 The public choice efforts to ascribe administrative behavior to selfish motives are
not even convincing on their own terms. Niskanen's theory, as RobertYoung points out, is
not really a self-interest-based hypothesis, because the salaries of administrators in the
United States are not directly related to their agency's budget. Robert A. Young, Budget
Size and Bureaucratic Careers, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT 33 (Andr6 Blais &
Stfphane Dion eds., 1991). Migu6 and B6langer's theory is equally flawed, because a
larger discretionary budget is also unrelated to salary, and is only one component of
power. See Migu6 & B6langer, supra note 150. Anecdotal criticisms of bureaucratic behav-
ior tend to regard the central problem as what might be called "hassle minimizing." See,
e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in
ORGANIZATION THEORY 116, 143-46 (Oliver Williamson ed., 1990). But the idea of hassle is
too vague, and the process of minimizing too complex, to be modeled as a form of selfish
behavior.
156 E.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 300-09 (1984); MICHAEL PERT-
SCHUKy, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 119-52 (1982). The same is true forjudges. SeeALEx-
ANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 199-243 (1962); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 129, at 51-111.
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state. With respect to people's attitudes toward the state, the model
begins with the idea that people are impelled to create meaning at the
instantaneous, abstract, and life experience levels. At the instantane-
ous level, individuals must confer meaning of some sort on their sen-
sory impressions; at the more abstract level, they must confer meaning
on conceptual entities. The state is a conceptual entity, and phenom-
enology suggests that it must possess subjective meaning for its citi-
zens. With respect to the development of the administrative state,
phenomenology suggests that these meanings are generated intersub-
jectively, and thus shared by large groups of citizens.157 These mean-
ings produce a social consensus around certain issues, or broad-based
social movements that agitate on behalf of other issues. The interac-
tion among consensus, social movements, and economically inspired
interest groups then generates the governmental structures that con-
stitute the modern state. 158 Thus, the phenomenological model pro-
vides a more plausible account of people's attitudes toward the state
and the way that the state develops. Furthermore, phenomenology
illuminates the organic linkage between the two, thus providing a
more satisfying solution to the macro-micro problem.
Unlike public choice, which is essentially ahistorical, the phenom-
enological approach to political attitudes necessarily locates individu-
als in history; their intersubjective understandings are heavily
dependent on temporally specific attitudes and the evolution of ideas
from one generation to the next. One of the most crucial political
developments of the modern era is the shift from the traditional relig-
ious view that society is a stable, divinely established ordering, to the
idea that society is a contingent set of arrangements that can be al-
tered through conscious social policy.159 The administrative state is
both a product and a cause of this conceptual development. As the
idea of conscious social policy developed, people envisioned a differ-
ent and greatly expanded role for the government; it was expected to
intervene in the economic and social realms to secure the welfare of
its citizens. As the government assumed this role, it changed people's
sense about the scope and purpose of governmental action. At the
same time, government gradually lost the mystic, sacerdotal character
157 HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 88, at 182-86; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 88, at 94-95;
SCHUTZ, supra note 96, at 97-138.
158 On the process of state formation, see THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN
'WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly & Gabriel Ardant eds., 1975); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS
OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (1966); THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLU-
TIONS (1979); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE (1982); CHARLES
TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES AD 990-1992 (rev. ed. 1992); WEBER,
supra note 19, at 901-39.
159 See HABERMAS, supra note 77, at 143-271; FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SO-
CIETY (Charles P. Loomis trans., Transaction Books 1988) (1957).
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that it possessed in the Middle Ages. It came to be viewed as an instru-
mentality; not only was it expected to secure the welfare of its citizens,
but that was its only function, and the source of its essential character.
To put this perception in Weberian terms, people came to see the
government as an instrumentally rational agent that was supposed to
achieve the goals that they themselves established, either through val-
ues rationality or through some less reflective choice.1 60
The administrative state developed as a means of restoring the
balance that had been disrupted by the collapse of traditional society,
and a means of protecting ordinary people from the depredations of
the property-owning class. Capitalism, and perhaps democracy, would
not have survived the nineteenth century in Europe without labor
laws, unemployment compensation, welfare programs, public educa-
tion, public health, and other widely dispersed benefits. Thus, the
history that we observe is not one in which special interests continu-
ously carve small slices from a structure that was previously created by
some other unexplained mechanism. Rather, it is a history in which a
massive governmental apparatus was created and developed to solve
basic social problems and implement basic moral principles. Our cur-
rent administrative democracy reflects the gradual but steady develop-
ment of intersubjective understandings about political morality and
the purpose of government.
This is the way that people interpret government in a modern
administrative state. They regard the government as a problem-solv-
ing instrumentality, and they expect it to solve a wide range of eco-
nomic and social problems. If individuals are subjected to
discrimination, if the air is filled with smog, if the burglary rate is ris-
ing, if a horrific case of child abuse is reported, people's instinctive
reaction is that the government "should do something about it." Peo-
ple once thought of floods as provoked by the fury of nature or the
anger of God, and attempted to remedy the situation through prayer.
Presently, we are more likely to wonder why the Army Corps of Engi-
neers failed to prevent a catastrophe, or why the Federal Emergency
Management Agency was so slow in combating its effects.
The ordinary people who staff the modern state as administrators
share these attitudes. They believe that government should "do some-
thing" about the flood, or discrimination, or consumer abuse, and
they believe that they themselves are doing it when they perform their
regulatory roles. These culturally embedded attitudes are reinforced
by their personal preferences. Like everyone else, they want to act in
160 I develop this argument more fully in a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled On-
ward Past Arthur Rethinking Politics and Law for the Administrative State. See also supra notes
19-21 and accompanying text (discussing Weber's concepts of instrumental and values
rationality).
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accordance with their beliefs in order to give their lives meaning.
This will lead them to act in a manner congruent with their beliefs
about the purpose of government when carrying out their assigned
roles. It will also lead individuals to alter their beliefs to fit their as-
signed roles. This approach may be inefficient in certain circum-
stances, but it is far removed from the behavioral model of public
choice.
While people disagree about the proper scope of government in-
volvement, their opinions are usually determined by their interpreta-
tions of the situation rather than their interpretations of government.
For some people, the possible extinction of the spotted owl is a serious
problem, but the shortage of domestically grown lumber is not; for
others, the reverse is true. Once people perceive a problem, however,
they demand that the government take action to resolve it. This is
why a person who favors deregulation of airlines or the loosening of
environmental restrictions on industry can simultaneously favor mas-
sive increases in government spending to combat narcotics or to fight
against crime. It also explains why the majority does not vote for mas-
sive redistribution of property from the wealthy to themselves. Indi-
viduals do not regard the state as an arena of economic conflict, but as
a problem-solving apparatus. Thus, they may vote for some redistribu-
tion if they perceive poverty as a problem, but will go no further than
they deem necessary to conform with their situational analysis.
Interpreting government as a problem-solving instrumentality
not only generates expectations about institutional performance but
also limits people's regard or respect for the state to those situations
when it performs in an acceptable manner. As an instrumentality, the
government loses its former claim to divine right, to the uncondi-
tional loyalty of its citizens or subjects. Such loyalty often exists, but it
is directed to the nation rather than the state, to the land and its in-
habitants as a totality.161 Nationalism occupies the space that the ad-
ministrative state has opened up between the people and their
government. This attracts, for better or worse, the devotion that previ-
ously attached to the rulers of the state. The concept of government
as an instrumentality creates a framework in which government is
viewed as serving the nation rather than embodying it and can be eval-
uated on the quality of its performance. Thus, while it would be polit-
ical suicide for any American politician to condemn the United States
161 For discussion of nationalism, see DAVID BROWN, CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM
(2000); WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM (1994); BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S
BURDEN (1992); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); ADRIAN HASTINGS,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONHOOD (1997); Ross POOLE, NATION AND IDENTITY (1999);
ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIErH CENTURY (1979); ANTHONY D. SMITH,
THEORIES OF NATIONALISM (1971); WEBER, supra note 19, at 921-26.
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as a nation, many politicians regularly condemn the national
government.
In the last few years, legal scholars have begun to investigate the
law's expressive quality, or its ability to convey moral positions or com-
municate meaning. 162 This view amends Kelsen's idea that the law
functions by imposing sanctions,163 and weakens Hart's amendment
of Kelsen, which views the law as establishing guides for human con-
duct.164 A perceptive article by Lawrence Lessig goes further and sug-
gests that law can alter preexisting social meanings through a variety
of coercive and expressive methods.1 65 As Lessig notes, this is not new
to sociologists, but it is unfamiliar to law-trained people, so unfamiliar
that lawyers often regard this approach as a violation of the First
Amendment.166 Lessig initially regards this reaction as a conundrum,
but it becomes explicable if one distinguishes between the state's crea-
tion of social meaning and the social meaning of the state, which is
the topic of this discussion. The meaning of the modem administra-
tive state for its citizens is that it is an instrumentality for achieving the
goals that people independently identify. As such, the state is ex-
pected to exhibit instrumental rationality on its own, but its goals
come from the choices of the citizenry. As a result of the state's ex-
panded role in the economic and social realms, it will necessarily cre-
ate meaning as a by-product of its efforts, and will sometimes
manipulate social meanings at the micro level to achieve its policies.
But it is not supposed to consciously manipulate the basic political
choices of its citizens.
Clearly, this understanding of the administrative state overlaps
with the idea of democracy that figures so centrally in the political
attitudes of Americans and Western Europeans. The definition of de-
mocracy, as I argue elsewhere, is so vague that scholars should dis-
pense with the term and thereby avoid its complex connotations.167
For present purposes, democracy can be defined as a government that
uses popular elections to determine the succession of its leading offi-
162 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Meant 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591
(1996); Richard H. Pildes, Wy Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
AfterShaw v. Reno, 92 MicH. L. REv. 483 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996). For a critique of this trend, see Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000).
163 HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 58-64 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1945).
164 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40-41 (1961).
165 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,
1008-14 (1995).
166 See id. at 946-47.
167 Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 715 (2001).
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cials and allows open interaction with the citizenry at both the legisla-
tive and administrative levels. 168 This form of government developed
contemporaneously with the administrative state in the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, and this simultaneity is far from
adventitious. Democracy represents a rejection of divine right and
thus undermines any transcendental justifications for the government
because the identity of its leaders represents a contingent choice by
the people. The primary rationale that underlies this choice, and peo-
ple's interaction with legislators and administrative agencies, is that
the government is supposed to be responsive to people's preferences.
As a result, the meaning of democracy is closely related to the instru-
mentalism that forms the meaning of the administrative state.169 Con-
versely, any understanding of our modem administrative system must
recognize that this system is intimately connected with the democratic
political process that is so suffused with meaning for Americans. 170
Varying theories of human motivation thus suggest different
images of the modem administrative state as a totality. If one begins
with the theory that people are motivated by material self-interest, one
ends up with a state composed of a conglomeration of special interest
deals that people perceive as an intrusion on individual autonomy and
a source of special interest benefits. If one believes that people are
motivated by the desire to create meaning for themselves, the admin-
istrative state emerges as a reflection of their intersubjective commit-
ments and is viewed as an instrumentality for achieving these
commitments.
Thus, not only is the starting point of the phenomenological
model more plausible from an empirical perspective, but the
endpoint is more plausible as well. Public choice treats the modern
state as a vast, diffuse conspiracy by narrow elites to mislead or divert
the majority of citizens. It explains away all the regulatory initiatives
that respond to citizen concerns as complex subterfuges. These ac-
counts become increasingly elaborate when they confront initiatives
impelled by modem social movements such as environmentalism or
animal rights. The phenomenological model suggests that the growth
of the administrative state resulted from an intersubjectively gener-
ated demand for public control of the economic and social spheres.171
As the force of tradition waned, voters demanded that the mechanism
168 Id. at 755-91.
169 This applies to our own nation. Many dictatorships over the last two centuries have
also been administrative states. Many of these governments claimed to be democracies,
but their real justification and the source of their appeal was nationalism, not administra-
tion or democracy as we understand it.
170 See Moe, supra note 155, at 120-21.
171 SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1975) (1973); 1 HABERMAS, supra note 77, at 143-271.
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of the administrative state be used to remedy situations perceived as
societal problems. A historically grounded, widely felt belief of this
nature seems more capable of generating the administrative state than
the underhanded strategies of small groups of political elites.
The plausibility of this account provides an additional argument
against the public choice model. One might argue that it is simply the
same argument, that an implausible starting point will yield an im-
plausible conclusion. But political theory is not a syllogism; it is a mat-
ter of judgment, of assessing the plausibility of explanations by
partially intuitive criteria. The public choice theory of motivation may
exhibit some serious empirical difficulties, but it cannot be definitively
proven false. It is always possible to generate explanations that rescue
public choice theory. In fact, phenomenology suggests that such ex-
planations generally will be offered because people's interpretive ca-
pacities are so extensive in nature and so driven by their subjective
need for meaning. Thus, the rejection of public choice on the basis
of its theory of motivation must be provisional. The fact that public
choice's theory of motivation produces an image of the state that is
equally implausible provides another locus of critique, and an inde-
pendent reason why we need to move beyond public choice to formu-
late different theories of political behavior.
IV
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIVAL IMAGES
Because one's image of the state serves as a pre-empirical starting
point for political and legal analysis, public choice and phenomenol-
ogy lead scholars in distinctly different directions. The two theories
generate different attitudes toward government and suggest different
research agendas. Political scientists have recognized the importance
of agenda-setting in governmental contexts for some time-an insight
that they owe to collective choice scholarship. 172 Agenda-setting in
academics is equally important. Before the scholar begins an empiri-
cal journey, she must decide where she will go and what she will look
for. These decisions are necessarily pre-empirical and generally pre-
analytic. They operate at an intuitive level that scholars rarely per-
ceive or understand, but which determines the entire direction of re-
search. In so doing, they construct our image of politics itself and
produce important effects on the political world.
172 See ARROiW, supra note 7; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilib-
rium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 Aml.J. POL. Sci. 27 (1979). But the idea has been
independently developed by left-oriented political scientists as well. See STEPHEN Lu, S,
POWER: A RADIcAL VIEW 36-45 (1974); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Bararz, The Two Faces of
Power, 56 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 947 (1962).
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This Symposium is appropriately tided Beyond Cynicism, because
cynicism is inevitably the attitude of public choice scholarship.
Jonathan Macey argues that cynicism should be adopted as the norma-
tive stance of citizens and scholars; 173 in fact, it is an unexamined and
virtually unavoidable starting point if one subscribes to public choice.
The dictionary defines cynical as "distrusting or disparaging the mo-
tives of others. '174 If one treats the modem administrative state as
meaningless and denies the meanings that citizens ascribe to it, then
one is necessarily distrusting their motives and adopting a cynical posi-
tion. There is nothing cynical about treating the owner of a business,
or a consumer buying artichokes, as trying to maximize his material
self-interest. The business owner or artichoke buyer would cheerfully
agree that they are self-interest maximizing. An observer who regards
him in this fashion is not being cynical or distrusting, but simply tak-
ing them at their word. But treating government officials as maximiz-
ing their self-interest is clearly cynical, because that is not what they
are supposed to be doing, and not what they themselves believe that
they are doing.
There is substantial self-interest maximizing among public offi-
cials, but public choice's blindness to the meaning of the modem
state transforms this observation from an empirical finding to a pre-
analytic starting point, and from an inevitable disruption of the gov-
ernmental system to the essence of that system. This can be illustrated
with the simple example of golf. Most golfers play because they find it
enjoyable and obtain pleasure from improving their skills and defeat-
ing fellow golfers. In other words, golf has meaning for them. If one
rejects the possibility that golf has meaning for these individuals, one
must search for explanations that deny the golfer's motives and pos-
sess an inherently cynical character. Perhaps the golfer is attempting
to get a suntan, or avoid his family, or make business contacts among
his fellow golfers. One might even obtain empirical evidence to sup-
port these ulterior motives. But the assumption that these alternative
motives must be lurking within the golfer's brain is a pre-empirical,
pre-analytic assumption that results from the denial of golfs meaning.
Armed with this assumption (or more precisely, handicapped by it)
the golf researcher will elevate every casual comment and fugitive ges-
ture into a revelation of ulterior motive and construct elaborate hy-
potheses about the existence of such motives for which no empirical
evidence is available.
Public choice scholars have done precisely the same thing in their
analyses of the modern administrative state. Having begun from a po-
173 Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 COR-
NELL L. REv. 280, 293-95 (2002).
174 THE RANDOM HOUSE DIcrIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 360 (8th ed. 1981).
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sition that denies that state its meaning, public choice scholars are
impelled to search for other explanations. The fact that these expla-
nations are based on self-interest maximizing does not represent an
empirical conclusion, but merely restates the assumption that led pub-
lic choice scholars to reject the state's accepted meaning and begin
their search. In conducting such a search, no evidence for public-
oriented motivations is acceptable-it would be naive to accept it
when there must be something else behind it. Conversely, every wisp
of evidence for self-interested behavior is pursued, every vague possi-
bility amplified into a general explanation, and every puff of self-inter-
ested smoke assumed to indicate the presence of all-consuming fire of
egoism or avarice. If no evidence is immediately forthcoming, elabo-
rate narratives of self-interest are constructed-tales of extraordinary
deviousness, coordination, and conspiracy. If necessary, tautological
conceptions of utility are employed in a desperate effort to avoid the
possibility that government officials might possess some modicum of
sincerity and act conscientiously. This is one reason why the
bathwater of public choice must be reinterpreted. While there is
some evidence to support public choice's assertions, the assessment of
that evidence is skewed by the pre-empirical assumptions that consti-
tute public choice's implausible baby.
A further difficulty with public choice analysis is that the scholar's
necessary engagement with her subject matter dictates that public
choice proponents assign some meaning to the state and to political
processes in general. The fact that the public choice theory of motiva-
tion leads them to deny the meaning of the administrative state might
result in a conception of the state as the product of purely self-inter-
ested action by individuals. There is little to say about it, from a moral
perspective, just as there is nothing to say about the female black
widow's practice of eating its mate after copulation. Psychologically,
this is a difficult view to maintain about the normatively charged polit-
ical environment in which we exist, and public choice scholars gener-
ally do not maintain it. What they do instead is inject
unacknowledged meanings into the vacuum created by their denial of
the meaning to the modem state.
These imported meanings emerge from the political and legal
traditions that predate the modem state. Such traditions are embed-
ded in such basic political ideas as law, democracy, and legitimacy. 175
They pervade our political and legal thought, and thereby obscure the
realities of contemporary administrative government. For virtually all
political scientists and legal scholars, these inherited meanings func-
tion as additional pre-empirical, pre-analytic positions from which that
175 See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded-
ness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481, 482 (1985).
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government is assessed, and frequently condemned. 176 Public choice
scholars are particularly vulnerable to this tendency because the mod-
em state is particularly meaningless for them. Perceiving no purpose
for administrative government and unwilling to describe the adminis-
trative state as a purely neutral occurrence, they fall back on inher-
ited, pre-modem norms. These norms, which are necessarily hostile
to the state that has displaced them, are adopted as an analytic start-
ing point that is so obvious that it need not be argued for. In fact,
there is a certain moralistic quality to public choice theory. Its propo-
nents are scandalized by government activities that everyone else ac-
cepts without concern, such as regulation of the economy, the use of
regulation for social purposes, and the delegation of authority to ad-
ministrative agencies. Their unwillingness to accept those practices is
couched as a concern for people's real preferences, but its more likely
origin is the inherited meanings that survive in the absence of any
countervailing force.
Consider, for example, the public choice position that regulation
represents an impediment to people's ability to maximize their self-
interest, unless they can use the regulation to obtain a benefit. This
practice could be viewed as inefficient because one segment of the
population profits at another's expense. But public choice scholar-
ship also treats government regulation as undesirable because it in-
trudes upon people's autonomy or liberty. To put this another way,
public choice theory strongly implies that people have a positive pref-
erence for autonomy, and that government regulation is presump-
tively undesirable because it conflicts with that preference.
This implication arises from natural rights theory, a leading
mode of thought in pre-modern times. Beginning with the four-
teenth-century debate over apostolic poverty, 177 political thinkers
maintained that people possessed certain rights as a matter of natural
law, or as a result of the world's general ordering that could be per-
ceived through reason. 178 Predominant among these natural rights
was the right to liberty-that is, the right to possess one's own body,
and the right to determine one's own course of action. 179 It was this
natural right to liberty that people exchanged for order and safety
176 This is explored more fully in my forthcoming work. See Rubin, supra note 160.
177 RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 17-31 (1979).
178 See, e.g., GRoTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk. I, ch. IX, at 21-23 (AC.
Campbell trans., M.W. Dunne 1901) (1738); HOBBES, supra note 2, chs. 14 & 15; JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT chs. 2-6, at 8-11 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, On the Law of Nature and Nations of Eight
Books, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PUFENDORF 148-57 (ch. 11.3) (Michael Seidler
trans., Craig L. Carr ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994); ROuSSEAU, supra note 108, at 2-15.
179 GROTIUS, supra note 178, bk. I, ch. I.V., at 19; HOBBES, supra note 2, ch. 14, at
189-91; LOCKE, supra note 178, ch. 2, at 8-9; KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 3, at 30-31;
PUFENDORF, supra note 178, at 140-48 (ch. 1H.2); ROUSSEAU, supra note 108, at 2.
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when they created the social contract. The great debate, which ex-
tended through the entirety of the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, was how much liberty people agreed to relinquish in this
process. 180 According to Grotius, they necessarily forfeited their natu-
ial liberty.' 8 ' According to Hobbes, they relinquished most of their
liberty, but retained the right of self-preservation. Therefore, Levia-
than could not demand that the citizenry immolate themselves or con-
fess to a crime, and under most circumstances, had to give them the
opportunity to buy their way out of military service.182 Locke insisted
that people retained more of their natural liberty, including the right
to obtain and preserve property.18 3 Rousseau then suggested that
people did not relinquish liberty because the state, as the embodi-
ment of the general will, made them truly free and thus provided civil
liberty in place of natural liberty, 184 a nifty solution that was also
adopted by Kant. 185
180 See TucK, supra note 177, at 60-62.
181 GROTIUS, supra note 178, bk. I, ch. III.VIII, at 63 ("[W]hy may not a whole people,
for the benefit of better government and more certain protection, completely transfer
their sovereign rights to one or more persons, without reserving any to themselves?").
182 HOBBES, supra note 2, chs. 17-18, 21. In Leviathan, Hobbes observed:
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe ... yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey. If
a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a
crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to
confesse it .... [A] man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against
the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall
with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as
when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place.
Id. ch. 21, at 268-69.
183 In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke stated:
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality,
liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands
of society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the
society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself, his liberty and property ... the power of the
society, or legislative constituted by them ... is obliged to secure every one's
property by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that
made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.
LocKE, supra note 178, § 131.
184 Jean Jacques Rousseau observed that "[m]an loses, through the social contract, his
natural liberty, along with an unlimited right to anything that he is tempted by and can get.
He gains civil liberty, along with ownership of all he possesses." RoussEAU, supra note 108,
at 26.
185 As Kant observed:
In accordance with the original contract, everyone ... within a people gives
up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as a mem-
ber of a commonwealth ..... And one cannot say: the human being in a
state has sacrificed a part of his innate outer freedom for the sake of an end,
but rather, he has relinquished entirely his wild, lawless freedom in order to
find his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon laws, that is,
in a rightful condition, since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving
will.
KANT, MErApnyslcs, supra note 3, at 93; see id. at 23-34, 89-95.
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Very few contemporary thinkers explicitly subscribe to this ap-
proach with the notable exception of Robert Nozick. 186 The problem
is that natural rights theory conflicts with modern constitutionalism,
modem social science, and the ethos of the administrative state. The
principle of constitutionalism is that the people may create any gov-
ernment they want without constraint. It replaces the hypothetical so-
cial contract with an actual, operative agreement, and thus creates
positive law rights in place of natural ones. The Supreme Court's ef-
forts during the substantive due process era to defend the natural law
right to property against the legislation of constitutionally established
authorities have been decisively rejected in modem constitutional
thought.187 In a surprisingly analogous manner, modern social sci-
ence treats liberty as socially constructed. As Hume observes, there
was no discrete moment when people entered into a social contract
and agreed to give up their natural liberty to create a social order. 188
Social contract theorists have subsequently made clear that the con-
tract is hypothetical and intended as a moral argument rather than a
description of actual events,18 9 but this is not a complete solution. As
Hegel argued, the fact that our concept of liberty is the product of a
historical process intertwined with the development of the modem
state has moral significance itself.190 Once we recognize that our lib-
erty is the result of a partially governmental process, the argument
that government and liberty are opposing forces loses its moral force.
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, the idea that
governmental action impinges on people's liberty is inconsistent with
the dominant understanding of the administrative state. Sometimes
the state impinges on liberty, but at other times it establishes and pro-
tects individual rights. Workers look to the administrative state for
186 ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 14-15 (1974).
187 For historical discussions focusing on non-academic criticism, see BARBARA H.
FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 29-107 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE LOCHNER ERA 101-32 (1993); PAUL
L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 128-69 (1972); CASS R_ SUNSTEIN, THE PAR-
TIAL CONSTITUTION 45-67 (1993); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA
488-507 (1965). For recent academic criticism, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST 14-30 (1980); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider",
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJistify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legay, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
188 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge & Peter H. Nidditch
eds., 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1990); DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS,
MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 465, 470-71 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985).
189 KANr, METAPHYSICS, supra note 3, at 43-49; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16
(1971). The term "hypothetical contract" comes from DAVID GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING:
CONTRACT, ETHICS, AND REASON 53-54 (1990).
190 For Hegel's views on social contract theory in particular, see HEGEL, supra note 109,
§§ 72-81, at 31-34. For his discussion of history, see GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (T.M. Knox trans., 1956).
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protection from oppression by their employers. Labor organization
laws, child labor laws, occupational health and safety laws, minimum
wage and maximum hours laws, and workers compensation laws are
all part of an elaborate regulatory framework established to temper
the power of capital. Consumers look to the administrative state for
protection against merchants. Citizens rely on government for protec-
tion against industrial pollution, infectious disease, and destitution in
their old age. Minorities turn to government for protection against
discrimination, women seek statutory protection against abusive
spouses and prejudiced employers, and children depend on the gov-
ernment for protection against abusive parents. To include the ability
to resist state seizure of one's property in the concept of liberty while
excluding the ability to resist oppressive employers or abusive parents
merely reiterates a pre-modern distinction that we no longer accept.
All this is familiar, of course. The point is that public choice is
particularly prone to a pre-modern, anti-administrative moral stance
because its motivational theory blinds it to the meaning of the admin-
istrative state. The phenomenological model of the state suggests a
different stance, and would channel legal scholarship in different di-
rections. To some extent, these directions were present in legal schol-
arship before the advent of public choice. Most legal scholars, then
and now, accept that public officials are motivated by the desire to
fulfill their roles in a meaningful fashion. But legal scholarship has
always suffered from its own pre-analytic assumptions and its own
blind spots and distortions. One of the virtues of public choice is that
it introduced social science literature into legal scholarship with the
promise of rescuing legal scholars from their insularity. Having done
so, however, public choice then diverted this initiative down its own
peculiar paths, and thereby failed to realize the possibilities of inter-
disciplinary efforts. Phenomenology, with its close link to social sci-
ence, offers a means of redirecting such efforts in more promising
directions.
For example, public choice taught legal scholars to pay close at-
tention to the non-legal actors that impact the legal process. Having
done so, however, it reduced all these actors to interest groups, and
assumed that they were motivated by self-interest. Public choice the-
ory thus foreclosed legal scholarship from attending to the vast and
varied scholarly literature on social movements that address many of
the same topics as legal scholarship and use many of the same meth-
odological resources.19' This literature treats social movements as dis-
tinct occurrences, and therefore perceives important differences
between a trade association attempting to protect its members' eco-
191 See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
nomic interests, and the civil rights, prisoners' rights, or environmen-
tal rights movements. What makes these movements distinct is that
they appeal to the ideology of their participants and mobilize large
groups of people who have no direct economic interest in the move-
ment's goals. 192 In other words, the participants are motivated by a
desire for meaning that is unconnected with self-interest in anything
but its tautological sense.193 The phenomenological model, which is
attuned to the distinctions that serve as the basis of social movements
research, would allow academics to incorporate this research into le-
gal scholarship. The result would produce a better understanding of
the political forces that influence many areas of law.
Public choice also offered to lead legal scholarship in a promising
direction by shifting the focus of researchers to the policymaking pro-
cess. Legal scholars were prone to overemphasize the importance of
courts, and to treat legislation as a declaration of rights, rather than as
a means of managing the state. Public choice promised to counteract
this view, but proceeded to treat legislation as corrupt policymaking
and an intrusion on the rights that it imported from the pre-adminis-
trative era. By depicting legislators as reelection maximizers, it fore-
closed the possibility that one could ever address a normative
discourse to them, that a scholar could serve any useful purpose by
framing recommendations to legislators about the preferable way to
design and draft legislation.
Public choice's failure to look beyond interest group politics in
the legislative sphere represents a lost opportunity that the phenome-
nological model of the state might redeem. Legal scholarship is
largely a prescriptive discourse that addresses recommendations to
public officials. These officials are primarily judges, but legislators
could also be the object of the legal scholar's efforts. It would be use-
ful and illuminating to develop a body of scholarship that counsels
legislators about the design and drafting of statutes given the domi-
nant role of statutes in the modem state. The failure of scholars to do
so thus far is partially attributable to the juro-centrisim of legal schol-
arship, but public choice, having partially counteracted this tendency,
can be blamed for then suggesting so strongly that the effort would be
useless.
The phenomenological model offers a similar view of legislation,
but a different view of legislators. It suggests that legislators are moti-
vated by a wide range of specific incentives that cumulatively provide
lawmakers with a sense of meaning. In addition to reelection, these
192 See supra notes 6, 64-65 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 66. Members of trade associations are also motivated by a desire for
meaning. The difference is that these individuals are able to construct meaning, at least in
this specific context, in terms of their economic interests.
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desires include implementing an ideology, serving constituents, and
impressing colleagues.' 94 As a result, the phenomenological model
suggests that legislators can be treated as conscientious policymakers,
and that recommendations about the design and drafting of laws can
be usefully addressed to them.
With respect to administrators, public choice again established
new directions for legal scholarship, only to divert academics down
pathways of limited value. Legal scholars had always been aware,
through the literature on capture, that regulators are strongly influ-
enced by those whom they regulated. The advent of public choice not
only brought this issue to the forefront, but gave it an importance that
precluded most other considerations. Public choice created an essen-
tially exaggerated dichotomy between expertise and pluralism, and
then elevated pluralism to the dominant consideration. As a result,
recommendations for improving the administrative process focused
primarily on pluralistic issues, such as the way to limit or direct inter-
est group pressures. Public choice itself offered few solutions; regula-
tion, in its view, was so thoroughly dominated by interest groups that it
was a lost cause. Under these circumstances, the best that could be
done was to deregulate and leave matters to the market. Other legal
scholars rejected this excessive fatalism and developed a literature that
includes Philip Harter's proposal for negotiated rulemaking, 95 and
Jody Freeman's recommendations for collaborative governance. 196
Through the efforts of the now defunct Administrative Conference of
the United States, Harter's proposal was adopted and then codified,
exemplifying the impact that legal scholarship can produce. 197
The influence of public choice focused the attention of legal
scholars on such pluralist solutions and undervalued recommenda-
tions predicated on expertise. Here again, the phenomenological
model of the state can restore balance. As noted above, the theory
suggests that administrators are motivated by the desire to implement
194 See BARBER, supra note 68, at 8-10, 13-15; DEERING & SMrriH, supra note 68, at
63-86; RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 81-139 (1973); JOHN W.
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATvES, AND PUBLIC POLICmS 37-45 (1984); JOHN W. KINGDON,
CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989); MuIR, supra note 69, at 139-57.
195 See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise 71 GEO. LJ. 1, 28-31
(1982).
196 SeeJody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 21-33 (1997).
197 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994). This is not to
suggest that negotiated rulemaking is the cure for bureaucracy's ills. In fact, the effective-
ness of negotiation in the regulatory environment has been widely questioned. See, e.g.,
Gary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
DUKE LJ. 1255, 1261 (1997); William Funk, IWien Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotia-
tion and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVrL. L. 55, 57 (1987); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43
DUKE LJ. 1206, 1212 (1994).
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an ideology, to perform their roles in an effective manner, and to act
in other ways that reflect a desire to live meaningful lives. Legal schol-
arship need not restrict itself to recommendations that reshuffle inter-
est group pressures. It can also frame recommendations to
administrators about the way to draft effective regulations, the way to
evaluate these regulations, the way to design effective enforcement
strategies, and the way to respond to citizen concerns. The phenome-
nological model would tend to validate this mode of discourse, and
thereby expand the possibilities for interdisciplinary scholarship in ad-
ministrative law.
CONCLUSION
This Article does not argue that public choice is useless. In fact,
rational choice theory provides valuable insights into the political pro-
cess, and furnishes a powerful tool for policy analysis. In evaluating a
governmental program, it is always useful to ask which interest groups
it benefits and which ones it disadvantages. The public choice ap-
proach is not a complete explanation, however. Not only does it fail
to provide a complete explanation of the entire range of political
events, which is the usual criticism, but it fails to provide a complete
explanation of any single political event.
The element of meaning will always be present. No matter how
clearly a public official acts in accordance with his material self-inter-
est or his self-interest generally, he will always be doing so as part of an
overall framework of meaning. This generalization not only applies to
transparent efforts to retain his job, but even to actions that go be-
yond the range of normal political behaviors in our society, such as
taking bribes. As empirical studies have revealed, even first-degree
murderers generally have a well-developed, deeply felt justification for
their actions. 198
Academics regard phenomenology, apart from its metaphysical
aspects, as a theory of individual behavior. 199 It has been influential
in American sociology, but not in our political theory. In fact, as con-
tinental theory suggests, phenomenology has a great deal to tell us
about the political system. Its theory of human behavior, coupled
with our historical experience, provides a comprehensive account of
the administrative state's development and current operation. Phe-
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nomenology tells us that the evolution of government over the past
two hundred years is not the result of inadvertence, or a mysterious
cabal, or the perversion of government by special interest groups, but
a structure of meaning which citizens share intersubjectively, and
which represents their deepest individual commitments in the politi-
cal realm. As such, it points the way toward new directions for legal
scholarship that possess the same interdisciplinary emphasis as public
choice theory, but go beyond its pre-empirical, pre-analytic cynicism.
